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Peru’s success in first defeating the Shining Path guerrilla movement in 
the early 1990s and then  reducing coca cultivation in the mid-1990s 
demonstrates the effectiveness of a sequential approach to these problems; 
however, is the sequential approach an effective model for handling the dual 
threat, particularly in Colombia?  This thesis examines the overall effectiveness 
of two distinctly different strategies for dealing with the dual threat of drugs and 
terrorism in Colombia:  President Pastrana’s “drugs first” strategy and President 
Uribe’s unified campaign against both guerrillas and drugs.  It finds that President 
Uribe’s unified campaign was more effective than President Pastrana’s 
sequential strategy.  While President Pastrana’s drugs first strategy was 
relatively effective in targeting the illicit drug trade, it did not eliminate the illicit 
drug industry nor did it achieve its secondary objective of weakening the war-
making capacity of the FARC-EP.  President Uribe’s unified strategy met 
substantial initial success as regional and national security dramatically improved 
and a weakening of the FARC-EP was observed.  Despite such success, 
elimination of the FARC-EP still remains beyond Colombia’s reach and the 
continuation of counter-narcotic policies seem to be reaping diminishing returns.  
To continue making progress against both threats a continuation of a 
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Historically, counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics strategies have 
played a significant role in U.S. foreign policy, particularly in Latin America.  
Throughout the Cold War, U.S. counter-insurgency strategies dominated the 
approach toward troubled Latin American countries such as El Salvador and 
Nicaragua—where leftist insurgents threatened to spread communism in 
America’s own backyard.  In 1986, after President Reagan signed a National 
Security Directive that established international drug trafficking as a threat to 
national security, drugs slowly replaced the Soviet threat as a priority of 
American foreign policy, especially in the Andean region.  From this point 
onward, U.S. supply-sided counter-narcotics strategies would significantly impact 
U.S. relations with Latin American and Caribbean countries.   
Proponents of U.S. supply-side counter-narcotics policies believe the 
destruction of cultivation in source countries, targeting of production facilities, and 
interdiction of trafficking routes would increase production costs and reduce the 
supply of drugs.  They assumed that increased costs would be passed on to 
consumers and the increased scarcity of drugs would result in lesser availability, 
increased prices, and reductions in drug purity.  Yet, after more than two 
decades of focusing on this supply-side strategy, there has been minimal, if any, 
effect on the price, purity, and availability of cocaine or heroin in the United 
States.1  
U.S. policy in Latin America has long stressed that a war on drugs is 
central to any effort to undermine armed non-state actors who benefit from 
involvement in the drug trade.  Therefore, the United States has continually 
advocated unified campaigns against drugs and guerrillas to countries facing a 
dual threat – Peru in the 1980s and 1990s, Colombia in the 1990s to the present, 
and in Afghanistan today.  However, Latin American governments and militaries                                             
1 United States Department of Justice, National Drug Threat Assessment 2007 (Johnston, 
Pa: National Drug Intelligence Center, 2006), p. 3 and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
World Drug Report 2006 (New York: United Nations, June 2006), p. 368. 
  2
have argued that efforts to fight drugs can often undermine counter-insurgency 
efforts and threaten democratic stability.  When the livelihood of the coca-
growing peasant is under attack by state eradication efforts, peasants tend to 
shift their support to armed actors or warlords involved in the drug trade and stop 
cooperating with the state and its counter-insurgency efforts.   
There is extensive literature on the minimal impact that supply-sided 
counter-narcotics efforts have had on the price, purity and availability of drugs in 
the United States.  But the side-effects of counter-narcotics approaches in the 
countries themselves have received less attention.  Vanda Felbab-Brown, a Ph. 
D. candidate at MIT, is one of the few political scientists to have examined the 
problematic relationship between counter-drug and counter-terrorism efforts.  In 
her dissertation “The Coca Connection: The Impact of Illicit Substances on 
Militarized Conflict,” Felbab-Brown examines how the production and trafficking 
of illicit drugs fuels militarized conflict.  According to her findings, the advantages 
that insurgents receive from access to drug production and profits are more than 
simply financial.  Their involvement also brings political and military benefits, in 
addition to profits.  This finding challenges the prevailing rationale behind 
international drug policies, particularly those in Colombia at the onset of Plan 
Colombia, which claim government suppression of illicit crops will decrease the 
capability and strength of the guerrillas or terrorists who utilize the drug industry 
as a source of revenue.  According to Falbab-Brown, this suppression has the 
potential to generate popular support for the insurgency – a key element in its 
survival.  Her analysis clearly demonstrates the potential for counter-narcotics 
efforts to undermine counter-terrorism objectives when a source country is faced 
with the dual threat of drugs and insurgency.2         
So how should a country deal with the dual threat of drugs and terrorism?  
The strategies typically used to eliminate these threats follow either a sequential 
                                            
2 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The Coca Connection: The Impacts of Illicit Substances on 
Militarized Conflict,” April 2004; Internet; accessed from MIT website 
http://web.mit.edu/polisci/students/vfelbab-brown/coca_connection.pdf on 10 February 2005 and 
Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan: When Counter-narcotics Undermines Counterterrorism,” 
Washington Quarterly 28, No. 4 (Autumn 2005), pp. 55-72. 
  3
method of elimination or a simultaneous method of attacking both threats.  
Sequential strategies are employed for two reasons:  first, to attack the more 
dangerous threat first.  The second is based on the rationale that to eliminate one 
threat will weaken the other.  The sequential method was employed in Peru (the 
crux of Falbab-Brown’s study), where the Shining Path guerrillas were viewed as 
a greater threat to national security than was the drug trade.  Not only did the 
guerrillas pose a significant national security threat, but they also undermined the 
government’s ability to conduct effective counter-narcotics operations in areas 
controlled by the guerrillas.  Thus, the elimination of the guerrilla threat first was 
not only thought to be necessary to protect national security but this also allowed 
the government to attack the drug trade effectively.  The Peruvian case suggests 
that a simultaneous campaign to conquer both drugs and guerrillas is ineffective 
and even counterproductive because simultaneous efforts against both problems 
target the livelihood of the peasants (drugs) and tends to push them further into 
the hands of the guerrillas.  Valuable sources of intelligence vital to the counter-
insurgency effort are also lost in the process. 
In Colombia, proponents for a purely counter-insurgency strategy state 
Colombia’s violence existed decades before the drug industry developed.  
Although drugs may have escalated the conflict, as Falbab-Brown and economist 
Francisco Thoumi make clear, they are not the root cause of Colombia’s conflict.  
Therefore, it is agreed that a policy purely focused on counter-narcotics will not 
bring stability to Bogotá.  According to Thoumi, the drug industry developed in 
Colombia because “institutions were weak, state legitimacy was challenged by 
many excluded from power, and law enforcement was ineffective and arbitrary.”3  
Those who agree with Thoumi, see the insurgents as the principal threat 
because they undermine the government’s legitimacy and challenge its authority 
in many regions of Colombia.  Proponents of a counter-insurgency approach, 
such as President Fujimori in Peru, argue that if the government can take control,  
                                            
3 Francisco Thoumi, “The Numbers Game: Let’s All Guess the Size of the Illegal Drug 
Industry,” TNI Crime and Globalization Paper, December 2003; Internet; accessed from 
http://www.tni.org/crime-docs/numbers.pdf on 05 September 2005. 
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secure, and maintain a state presence in these regions, counter-narcotics 
policies (such as alternative development) can then be implemented more 
successfully.   
Others argue that although Colombian insurgents generate revenue from 
kidnapping, extortion, and other illegal activities.  The 1982 decision by the 
Revolutionary Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP) to engage in the 
drug trade has provided them with the wherewithal to escalate what was a 
marginal insurgency into a major threat to Colombian political stability.  The U.S. 
and Colombian governments view drugs as the insurgency’s economic center of 
gravity and thus believe that an elimination of the drug trade will decrease 
insurgent revenues and its capability to fight.  Yet, opponents contend that an 
attack on one source of financing (e.g., the drug trade) will only cause the 
guerrillas to compensate by seeking other illegal revenue-generating activities 
(e.g., kidnapping, extortion, cattle rustling, fuel theft, etc.) and may even escalate 
the conflict as the group tries to protect its main sources of revenue.4  
Proponents of the simultaneous attack on a dual threat view both 
guerrillas and drugs as equally threatening.  Insurgents are always looking for 
opportunities to make money.  The growth of a globalized drug trade centered in 
the Western Hemisphere in Colombia has made it increasingly difficult to 
separate the two threats or at least attack one without impacting the other.  
Critics of a “simultaneous” strategy contend that, while separating the threats 
may be difficult, it is the division of resources used to combat the threats 
simultaneously that actually compromises the ability of the government 
effectively to eliminate either of the threats.5  
                                            
4 Phil Williams, “Warning Indicators, Terrorist Finances, and Terrorist Adaptation” in Strategic 
Insights VI, Issue 1 (January 2005) and Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombia Labyrinth: The 
Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 2001), p. 66.  
5 Emma Björnehed, “Narco-Terrorism: The Merger of the War on Drugs and the War on 
Terror,” Global Crime 6, no. 3 & 4 (August-November 2004), pp. 318-321. 
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Ideally, in areas where terrorist organizations are heavily involved in the 
drug industry, counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism strategies should be 
complementary.  Therefore, the target of supply-side counter-narcotics strategies 
should not be to decrease the number of hectares under cultivation.  The ultimate 
goal is to decrease the resource base of insurgents.  It seems rational that 
counter-narcotics efforts would at least assist the counter-terrorism objective of 
decreasing the strength of armed non-state actors.  Yet, in practice, counter-
narcotics and counter-terrorism policies may not be mutually supportive, as 
witnessed by Fujimori’s policy in Peru and even U.S. policy in Afghanistan until 
recently.6   
The Peruvian case clearly demonstrates the effectiveness of a sequential 
approach to managing a dual threat.  But, as pointed out by Lieutenant Michael 
Hobaugh in “Colombia’s War on Drugs: Can Peru Provide a Recipe for Success,” 
it is not clear that the Peruvian case is either comparable or applicable to 
Colombia.7  Apart from the economic factors and successful interdiction tactics, 
the nature of the Colombian terrorist threat is completely different than the threat 
posed by the Shining Path in Peru.  In Colombia, there are multiple armed non-
state actors vying for power, from left-wing insurgent groups such as the FARC-
EP and the National Liberation Army (ELN) to right-wing paramilitary organization 
such as the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), which were 
demobilized in 2006.  The organization of the insurgencies is also far more 
decentralized than in Peru.  In this regard, Colombia is more comparable to 
Afghanistan which faces a multi-faceted threat from drugs and numerous armed 
non-state actors.  In fact, it is perhaps not too much of a stretch to call Colombia 
the Afghanistan of South America in terms of its history, the fact that the central 
government in Bogotá has never successfully controlled its hinterland, and the 
threat combination of drugs and non-state actors.     
                                            
6 For additional information on U.S. policy in Afghanistan see Vanda Felbab-Brown, 
“Afghanistan: When Counter-narcotics Undermines Counter-terrorism.” 
7 Michael Hobaugh, Colombia’s War on Drugs: Can Peru Provide a Recipe for Success? 
(Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2000). 
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In Colombia, as in Afghanistan, Washington is now supporting unified 
campaigns against both drugs and terrorism.  Since counter-narcotics and 
counter-terrorism strategies are being applied simultaneously, it is all the more 
important to understand the interaction of these two approaches in countries 
facing a threat from multiple armed non-state actors engaged in the drug trade.  
In Colombia, unlike in Peru, the interaction and impact of counter-narcotics and 
counter-terrorism strategies has yet to be determined.   Therefore, this thesis will 
utilize Colombia as a case study to address the following questions:  What is the 
relationship between counter-narcotics efforts and counter-insurgency 
strategies?  Do these two strategies support or undermine each other?  In other 
words, what is the best strategy to deal with the dual threat associated with drugs 
and terrorism?  How do you attack each, and in what order?     
A. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES  
This thesis is based on an analytical survey of primary and secondary 
sources regarding the employment of counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency 
policies in Colombia since the beginning of increased U.S. assistance in 1999.  
Additionally, it will incorporate interviews conducted with members of U.S. 
Southern Command as well as members of the U.S. academic community.   
Colombia was selected as a case study because it is currently the country 
where the nexus of drugs and terrorism is most prominent.  Although Colombia 
has been the focal point of U.S. counter-narcotics assistance over the years, only 
in 2002 was it allowed to be put toward counter-terrorism efforts.  While there is a 
significant amount of literature available on the impact of U.S. counter-narcotics 
efforts in Colombia on the drug supply, little research has been conducted on 
how these efforts have impacted Colombia’s counter-terrorism initiative against 
its armed non-state actors.  The Colombian case also represents a multi-polar 
system where there are several armed non-state actors with varying interests; 
this makes it more comparable than the Peruvian case to the current situation in 
Afghanistan.    
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B. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Peru’s success in battling the guerrilla threat first (in the early 1990s) and 
later the drug threat demonstrates the effectiveness of a sequential approach; 
however, is the sequential approach an effective model for handling the dual 
threat, particularly in Colombia?  To answer this question, this thesis will examine 
the overall effectiveness of two distinctly different strategies for dealing with the 
dual threat of drugs and terrorism in Colombia:  President Pastrana’s drugs first 
strategy and President Uribe’s unified campaign against both guerrillas and 
drugs.  This thesis will argue that President Uribe’s unified campaign was more 
effective than President Pastrana’s sequential strategy.  While President 
Pastrana’s drugs first strategy was relatively effective in targeting the illicit drug 
trade, it did not eliminate the illicit drug industry nor did it achieve its secondary 
objective of weakening the war-making capacity of the FARC-EP.  President 
Uribe’s unified strategy met substantial initial success as regional and national 
security dramatically improved and a weakening of the FARC-EP was observed.  
With respect to counter-narcotics, President Uribe maintained marginal 
reductions in total area under cultivation until 2005.  Despite such success, 
elimination of the FARC-EP still remains beyond Colombia’s reach and the 
continuation of counter-narcotic policies seem to be reaping diminishing returns.  
To continue making progress against both threats, albeit slow, continuation of a 
comprehensive unified campaign is required.  This thesis will conclude by 
proposing policy recommendations for Colombian government as well as for U.S. 
policy in Colombia.   
Chapter II will provide a foundation for understanding the current conflict in 
Colombia from a historical perspective.  It will discuss the origins of the decades-
old civil war as well as the escalating threat posed by the main armed non-state 
actor in Colombia, the FARC-EP.  It will focus primarily on the FARC-EP as this 
organization is considered the largest threat to consolidation of the Colombian 
state and the principal target of the state’s counter-insurgency campaign.8  This 
                                            
8 Both the AUC and the ELN will only be mentioned briefly as the demobilization process with 
the paramilitaries and the potential for a cease-fire agreement with the ELN has the potential to 
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chapter will also show the rise of the illicit drug industry in Colombia during the 
1990s and argue that increased guerrilla involvement in this profitable market not 
only stimulated and sustained their growth but exacerbated the violence.  Finally, 
the chapter will offer a synopsis of the strategies implemented under Colombia’s 
last two presidents to address the dual threat of drugs and insurgency.   
Chapter III will analyze the impact of counter-narcotics efforts 
implemented with U.S. assistance, both before 2002 (when U.S. assistance and 
most of the Colombian government’s efforts were strictly driven by counter-
narcotics efforts) and after 2002 (when U.S. assistance and Colombian 
government efforts supported a unified campaign against both drugs and 
terrorism).  It will argue that Colombian government strategies led to a substantial 
decline in the amount of coca under cultivation from 2000 to 2002, the returns on 
increased eradication efforts since 2004 seem to be diminishing.  It will also 
argue that the decreases in cultivation within Colombia were offset by other, 
negative effects of the counter-drug policies, including environmental 
degradation, increases in the amount of “attempted” cultivation, and the 
geographic shifts in cultivation both within Colombia and the Andean region in 
general.  Finally, this chapter will argue that the number of hectares of coca in 
Colombia is a poor indicator of the effectiveness of U.S. supply-side counter-
narcotics policy.  Despite record levels of eradication and interdiction, Plan 
Colombia has failed to decrease the flow of illicit drugs to the United States—one 
of the underlying objectives for U.S. support of Plan Colombia.  
Chapter IV will analyze the impact of Plan Colombia’s “Push into Southern 
Colombia” (2000-2002) and President Uribe’s Democratic Security and Defense 
Policy (2003-2005) on the strength of the FARC-EP, one of the main perpetrators 
of violence in Colombia.  It will argue that while Plan Colombia’s “Push into 
Southern Colombia” did reduce the number of hectares of coca under cultivation, 
its impact on the FARC-EP was negligible.  Plan Colombia did not substantially 
weaken the FARC-EP, as proponents insisted, nor did it strengthen the 
                                            
make them marginal actors in Colombia’s internal conflict. 
  9
organization, as critics of government efforts have charged.  Finally, this chapter 
will acknowledge that President Uribe’s “unified” strategy against drugs and 
insurgents marginally diminished the military threat posed by the FARC-EP. 
Finally, after summarizing the effectiveness of each strategy Chapter V 
will highlight that President Uribe’s unified campaign was more effective against 
the dual threat of drugs and insurgency.  The drug trade in Colombia has 
become a force multiplier for a number of Colombia’s armed non-state actors, 
therefore, to stop targeting the drug trade is an unfathomable option for Bogotá.  
Despite only marginal changes in coca cultivation levels, President Uribe’s 
counter-insurgency strategy has decreased the strength of the guerrillas and 
assisted Colombia in consolidating control over its national territory, which in turn 
has decreased cultivation in areas now under increased state control but 
increasing it in areas not fully under its control.  Therefore, Chapter V will argue 
that the nature of the multi-dimensional threat confronting the Colombian 
government calls for a continuation of Uribe’s comprehensive unified strategy 
and conclude by offering some policy recommendations to the Government of 
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II. THREAT ASSESSMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION  
As the only South American country that borders both the Atlantic and 
Pacific oceans, Colombia is the fourth largest country in Latin America and one 
of the continents most populous nations.  Unlike many countries in Latin 
American, Colombia has never suffered any dramatic economic collapse or 
periods of hyperinflation.  In fact, the Colombian economy produced 
uninterrupted positive growth from the early 1930s through the late 1990s.9  
However, Colombia’s economic performance is often overshadowed by its 
daunting political history.  Considered the longest standing democracy in Latin 
America, Colombia continues to be plagued by the violence associated with its 
decades-old civil conflict and the war against drugs.  Despite recent reductions in 
measures of violence (i.e., kidnapping, murder, etc), Colombia remains one of 
the most violent countries in the world. 
The Colombian conflict is both deeply-rooted and complicated, involving 
two issues (drugs and control of national territory) and complex warring factions 
(left-wing guerrillas, criminal factions, paramilitary groups, and the Colombian 
government, which itself is represented by various entities with their own 
agendas).  Since the conflict is deep-rooted, a discussion of the current situation 
in Colombia is not complete without a brief look at the origins of the problems 
facing it.  This chapter will provide a foundation for understanding the current 
Colombian conflict in a historical context.  It will discuss the origins of the 
violence as well as the escalating threat posed by the main armed non-state 
actor in Colombia, the FARC-EP.  While there is more than one armed non-state 
actor in Colombia, this chapter will focus primarily on the FARC-EP as this 
organization is considered the largest threat to consolidation of the Colombian 
state and the principal target of the state’s counter-insurgency campaign.  It will 
show the rise of the illicit drug industry in Colombia during the 1990s and argue 
                                            
9 Rabasa and Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth, p. 4. 
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that increased guerrilla involvement in this profitable market not only stimulated 
and sustained their growth but exacerbated the civil conflict.  Finally, the chapter 
will offer a synopsis of the programs implemented under Colombia’s last two 
presidents to address not only the escalation of the country’s civil conflict but also 
the economic, political, and social challenges confronting the Colombian state 
from 1998 to the present.  
B. ORIGINS OF THE VIOLENCE 
Guerrilla movements in Colombia have their origins in the economic and 
social inequality and political oppression that are endemic in Colombian society.  
These movements, particularly the FARC-EP, trace their roots to the peasant 
struggles of the 1930’s and 1940’s, when landless peasants supported by 
reform-oriented Liberals challenged land-owning elites defended by the Roman 
Catholic Church.10  Colombia’s two traditional parties—the Liberals and the 
Conservatives—have competed for power since their establishment in the mid-
nineteenth century.  The competing patronage systems of these two dominant 
political parties contributed to the tensions and violence between political factions 
that has characterized Colombian political life for most of the twentieth century.  
The assassination in 1948 of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, a prominent Liberal champion 
of social and economic reform, escalated the decades-old conflict between these 
two traditional parties to the next level—civil war.  Known as La Violencia, the 
civil war quickly spread from Bogotá throughout rural Colombia eventually 
claiming over 200,000 lives before exhausting itself in the 1960s.11   
In an attempt to extinguish the uprising, the Colombian state (controlled by 
the Conservative Party at the time) increased its use of force and brutality 
against the Liberal resistance.  Correspondingly, thousands of Liberal peasants 
armed themselves and organized self-defense communities to protect against 
the expansion of the state-sponsored violence.  When Conservative President 
Laureano Gómez Castro was overthrown by a coup d’etat in 1953, the military 
                                            
10 While it’s true that some Liberals championed the peasantry, it must be noted that Liberal 
landowners opposed reform. 
11 Rabasa and Chalk, Colombia Labyrinth, p. 23. 
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government of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla initially negotiated a momentary 
halt to the violence.  However, a little over a year after taking office, the rural 
violence rekindled forcing General Rojas Pinilla to implement strict 
countermeasures.  The brutal efforts by government troops, police and 
Conservative paramilitaries to suppress the violence reinforced the need for and 
maintenance of rural self-defense communities.   
By 1957, it was clear that even the factions who backed the overthrow of 
President Gómez had wearied of the corruption and favoritism of the Rojas 
Pinilla regime.  An escalation of the violence in the countryside and the 
significant increase in strikes and protests, led to the ouster of the beleaguered 
general.  In 1958, the two parties entered into a comprehensive power-sharing 
agreement, called the National Front – a pact in which the Liberal and 
Conservative parties alternated control of the presidency and shared the number 
of elected and appointed offices in government for the next sixteen years.  
Although the agreement did bring an end to the heightened levels of violence 
associated with the years of La Violencia, the “restricted democracy” created by 
the National Front did not permit political participation outside of the Liberal and 
Conservative parties.  This restricted access to political power contributed to the 
emergence of armed insurgents in the guise of self-defense communities and 
communist enclaves located in southern Tolima, Meta, and Caquetá.  These self-
sufficient farming communities would later proclaim themselves to be 
“independent republics.”  The most legendary of these republics was Marquetalia 
located in the department of Tolima and led by the current leader of the FARC-
EP, Manuel Marulanda Vélez (aka “Tirofio” or “Sureshot”).   
In 1964, the Colombian Armed Forces were ordered by President 
Guillermo León Valencia to attack the independent republics in a counter-
insurgency campaign called Operation Marquetalia, which fell under Plan LASO 
(Latin American Security Operation)—a U.S. initiative against real and potential 
leftist rebels in Latin America, including Colombia.  In the case of Colombia, the 
particular objective of Plan LASO was to destroy the Communist military and 
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social infrastructure in Marquetalia and the surrounding areas.12  When the 
military retreated from these areas, the scattered peasant resistance groups, or 
rebels, reorganized under a loose alliance supported by the Communist Party, 
called the Southern Bloc.  A year and a half later, this guerrilla coalition would 
officially become the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)—a 
Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement that, in its view, traced its roots to “the 
tradition of Colombian agrarian struggle that started in the 1920s.”13   
C. RISE OF THE FARC-EP 
Over the course of multiple decades, the FARC has grown from a small 
peasant organization to the largest, most capable, and best-equipped guerrilla 
organization in Latin America.  Unlike most revolutionary groups, the leadership 
of the FARC is also drawn from the peasantry rather than the typical educated 
middle and upper classes.  The organization is based in areas of recent 
colonization—to include those areas where the “independent republics” 
previously existed— where it has maintained a base of support and influence, 
often acting as a de facto government through the establishment of schools, a 
judicial system, health care and other public services.   
From its inception until the late 1970s, the FARC expanded cautiously.14  
During this time period, the FARC’s objective was survival.  Therefore, significant 
effort was directed at military ambushes and raids on farms which gained the 
organization access to weapons, equipment, food, and additional supplies. Such 
attacks were typically conducted within guerrilla-controlled territory and never 
significantly disrupted the operational capability of the Colombian government or 
                                            
12 Luis Eduardo Fajardo, “From the Alliance for Progress to the Plan Colombia: A 
Retrospective Look at U.S. Aid to Colombia” (London, UK: LSE, DESTIN, 2003), p. 15 and Grace 
Livingstone, Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democracy and War (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 2004), p. 45.  
13 Fabio Sanchez, Andres Solimano, and Michel Formisano, “Conflict, Violent Crime and 
Criminal Activity in Colombia” (New Haven, CT: Yale University, November 2002), p. 10. 
14 A front is a military unit that is delineated by geographic jurisdiction not necessarily its 
size.  For more information on the creation of FARC fronts see Rabasa and Chalk, Colombia 
Labyrinth, pp. 24-29. 
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its armed forces.  By the late 1970s, the military arm of the FARC had reached 
approximately 1,000 member dispersed throughout the country in nine fronts.15   
1. The FARC’s Seventh Guerrilla Conference 
After almost two decades of marginal growth and minimal 
accomplishments against the Colombian government, the FARC began to 
reconsider its defensive strategy (which was focused primarily on survival) as it 
transitioned into the 1980s.  The 1980s marked a historic turn in the growth and 
consolidation of the FARC.  In 1982, the FARC held its Seventh Guerrilla 
Conference where the organization evaluated its strategic objectives, policies, 
and plans.  It was at this conference that the FARC decided to shift from a 
defensive to an offensive strategy seeking to defeat the Colombian military, 
thereby, closing in on the organization’s ultimate objective of seizing power.  The 
new “strategic plan” set the FARC on a course for expansion and organization 
into an “Army of the People.”  Hence, the organization added the term “People’s 
Army” (EP) to its name as a sign of its anticipated evolution from hit-and-run 
guerrilla warfare to direct, conventional tactics as outlined at the conference.  
Pledging to double its fronts to 48 and increase the size of its force to a “little 
guerrilla army” of approximately 28,000 soldiers, the FARC-EP laid out a strategy 
to expand its influence to areas east of the Eastern Mountain Range and west 
toward the Central Mountain Range.16    
The FARC-EP’s decision to create an “Army of the People” would require 
a significant amount of financing.  This requirement was taken into consideration 
in 1982 when the conference conclusions stated that the resources necessary to 
develop its “strategic plan” could be acquired by any means possible.  Since the 
1970s, FARC-EP’s resources were typically acquired through the kidnapping and 
extortion of Colombian landlords and prominent business people.  The 1982 
                                            
15 Mario A. Murillo, Colombia and the United States: War, Unrest, and Destabilization (New 
York: Seven Stories Press, 2004), p. 62. 
16 Nazih Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in 
Colombia (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002), pp. 76-78 and Thomas Marks, 
Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 
Army War College, January 2002), p. 6. 
  16
conference reinforced the need to maintain these preexisting practices of 
acquiring funds as well as retain the FARC-EP’s establishment of “revolutionary 
taxes.”  Yet, the resources earned through kidnapping and extortion was not 
adequate to execute the FARC-EP’s new “strategic plan.”  Therefore, during the 
1980s the FARC-EP began expanding its influence to mid-sized cities (where it 
sought to exploit municipal funds) and strategic areas of natural resources 
(where it sought to exploit regional commodities such as oil, gold, emeralds and 
coal).17  At the time the conference took place, elements of the illicit drug industry 
(particularly the cultivation of coca and poppy) were beginning to materialize in 
some FARC-controlled regions.  In an effort to capitalize on this industry, the 
FARC-EP laid out formally in the unpublished “Conclusions” of its Seventh 
Guerrilla Conference its “policy of taxing the drug trade and mobilizing and 
recruiting people in the lower end of the drug business.”18 
2. Guerrilla Involvement in the Illicit Drug Trade 
The evolution of the FARC-EP’s role and relationship with the illicit drug 
trade is extremely complex and has evolved considerably over the years.  
Initially, the guerrillas opposed the cultivation of coca and found drugs to be 
counter-revolutionary—a decision heavily influenced by the FARC-EP’s political 
ideologue, Jacobo Arenas.19  Yet, as drug cultivation expanded into FARC-EP-
dominated regions, and peasants became reliant on coca as a form of income, 
the guerrillas slowly began to accept cultivation out of fear of losing their peasant 
support base.  The FARC-EP’s initial association with the illicit drug industry was 
in the form of taxes levied on local coca farmers in return for protection from the 
abuses of narco-traffickers as well as from police and anti-narcotic squads.   
The ultimate objective of the narco-trafficker is to acquire wealth, while the 
guerrillas see themselves as representing the interests of its peasant support 
                                            
17 Fabio Sánchez and Mario Chacón, “Conflict, State, and Decentralization: From Social 
Progress to an Armed Dispute for Local Control, 1974-2002,” Working Paper No. 70 (London: 
Crisis States Research Center, October 2005), p. 7 and Ken Eaton, “Armed Clientelism: The 
Negative Impact of Decentralization,” (Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005), pp. 24-25. 
18 Rabasa and Chalk, Colombia Labyrinth, p. 26. 
19 Ibid., p. 26. 
  17
base.  The significant presence of guerrillas in drug producing areas offset the 
narco-traffickers’ control over the price of coca leaves, coca paste, and wages.  
In areas under its control, the FARC-EP traditionally established minimum wages 
for coca leaf pickers as well as minimum prices for the coca leaf—which narco-
traffickers must pay to farmers.  In fact, it has been documented that in areas 
where the guerrillas’ presence is weak or nonexistent, the price of labor for 
raspachines, or coca pickers, is lower than in areas where it has a strong military 
presence.20  Due to the FARC-EP’s efforts to protect its peasant base and 
regulate market relations between the narco-traffickers and the cocaleros, or 
coca-growing farmers (e.g., forcing drug-traffickers to pay the peasants and 
laborers the market price of coca leaves and labor), many peasants viewed the 
FARC-EP as their protectors, thereby winning the organization a substantial 
amount of popular support in selected areas. 
Eventually, the guerrillas expanded their taxation system beyond the coca 
farmers and established tax structures that extracted revenues at every phase of 
the illicit drug process—from the transportation of precursor chemical to the 
transportation of the final product through their zones of influence.21  Initially, the 
narco-traffickers collaborated with the demands imposed by the guerrillas, paying 
the increased labor costs and additional taxes.  However, this cooperation 
collapsed as wealthy drug lords began looking for methods to bring their drug 
money earned from outside the country back into Colombia.  A number of drug 
lords began investing their newfound wealth in large estates in areas where state 
presence was weak.22  Like other wealthy landowners, the drug lords now 
became vulnerable to both kidnapping and extortion by the FARC-EP and other 
guerrilla groups.  Frustrated with guerrilla demands for “revolutionary taxes” and 
extortion, the narco-traffickers began supporting, or creating where none 
previously existed, armed self-defense organizations—which had operated in 
                                            
20 Richani, Systems of Violence, p. 110. 
21 Alfredo Rangel Suárez, “Parasites and Predators: Guerrillas and the Insurgent Economy 
of Colombia” in Journal of International Affairs 53, no. 2 (Spring 2000), p. 586.  
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Colombia for some time, seeking to protect local communities against extortion, 
kidnapping and other guerrilla practices.23  The significant amount of support the 
paramilitary forces received from the narco-traffickers, and later from their own 
involvement in the drug trade, continued to escalate Colombia’s violent conflict.       
3. FARC and Drugs in the 1990s: A Qualitative and Quantitative 
Shift 
The 1990s brought a fundamental shift in the nature of the Colombian 
conflict.  This was a period of growth and strengthening for the FARC-EP—an 
unintended consequence that originated from a series of tactical successes in 
U.S. counter-narcotics policies.  These successes included the dismantling of the 
Cali and Medellin drug cartels, disruption of the air bridge from Peru to 
Colombian, and the initiation of aerial fumigation programs in Colombia.  The 
destruction of the Colombia’s two major drug cartels dismantled the most 
powerful military opponents of the FARC-EP and decreased the ability of drug-
traffickers to resist FARC-EP taxes as part of the price of doing business.  The 
successful interdiction of coca being flown from Peru to Colombia processing 
facilities increasingly pushed coca cultivation into the areas of Colombia where 
the FARC-EP had a significant presence.  This shift in production provided the 
FARC-EP with unprecedented opportunities to tax the drug trade.  And some 
speculate that the increase in aerial fumigation during this time may have also 
deepened Colombian coca growers' support for the FARC-EP against a 
government that was seen as threatening their health and livelihood.  All of these 
events worked together to provide the FARC-EP with unprecedented 
opportunities to strengthen its decades-long insurgency against the Colombian 
government during the 1990s.24 
As drug cultivation shifted to Colombia from Bolivia and Peru the FARC-
EP increased its involvement in the illicit drug industry in eastern and southern 
Colombia, while the paramilitaries vied for control of drug producing areas to the 
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north.  In 1998 the General Accounting Office (GAO) cited a 1997 inter-agency 
assessment that insurgents, principally the FARC-EP, provided security to drug 
traffickers and engaged in “localized, small-scale drug cultivation and 
processing.”25  By 1999, the GAO reported guerrillas assisted in not only in 
providing security for laboratories and other drug activities but also for “storing 
and transporting cocaine within Colombia.”26  These qualitative changes in 
guerrilla involvement were perhaps less significant than the fact that the new 
coca growing regions in Caquetá and Putumayo, areas where the Colombian 
state historically had been absent, were effectively controlled by the guerrillas. 
 There was no question that a nexus existed between the guerrillas and 
the drug industry, but the amount of revenues earned from illicit drugs was 
extremely difficult to determine.  A number of studies in the late 1990s attempted 
to establish estimates of guerrilla drug revenues through the use of government 
data and media reports.  In 1994, Luis Alberto Villamarín Pulido, a major in the 
Colombian Army, estimated that the FARC-EP received $260 million from illegal 
drugs,27 while a more comprehensive study by Renssalaer Lee (1998) estimated 
the illicit drug income for the FARC-EP to be $381 million in 1997.28  An 
additional study by Ricardo Vargas (1999) determined that from 1991 through 
1996 guerrilla groups in Colombia received approximately 44.4 percent of their 
funding from drug trafficking.29  Yet, according to Lee’s estimates, 70 percent of 
FARC-EP revenues in 1997 were related to illegal drugs, placing them on the 
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high end of Vargas’ average.30  Despite the discrepancies and lack of precision, 
these estimates clearly indicate that the FARC-EP’s expanded role in the illicit 
drug industry in the 1990s had become one of its main sources of funding.  
4. Escalation of the Conflict – FARC-EP on the Offensive  
Increased revenues provided the wherewithal for the FARC-EP to expand 
into the “little guerrilla army” it had envisioned in 1982, reaching an estimated 
12,000 to 15,000 soldier by the end of the 1990s.31  In late August and early 
September of 1996, amidst the backdrop of one of the largest peasant 
mobilizations of the decade,32 the FARC-EP launched a country-wide military 
offensive in which a number of simultaneous attacks were launched throughout 
the country.  Approximately 150 people were killed in the attacks, including an 
unknown number of civilians.33  During this offensive, a growth in the FARC-EP’s 
military capability was clearly demonstrated as the organization managed to 
coordinate approximately 400 combatants on 5 fronts and a Special Forces unit 
in the assault of an army base in Las Delicias, killing approximately 20 and 
wounding another 20 in the raid while taking 67 soldiers hostage.34  This attack 
would serve as the beginning of a series of devastating, large-scale, multi-frontal 
attacks conducted by the FARC-EP against the Colombian military over the next 
two years.   
By August 1998, the guerrillas conducted one of the most sustained 
offensives in the country’s decades-long civil war.  The three-day nation-wide 
offensive took close to 300 lives, wounded hundreds more and resulted in the  
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capture of nearly 100 soldiers.35  During the offensive, the insurgents assaulted a 
heavily fortified major military anti-drug base, Miraflores, located in southeast 
region of the Guaviare province—the heart of Colombia’s coca growing region.  
Forty other installations were also attacked, including police stations and oil 
facilities in more than half of Colombia’s 32 provinces.36  The offensive—
described by Alfredo Rangel as “the largest disaster in the history of the 
insurgency”37—came just days before Andrés Pastrana was sworn-in as 
Colombia’s 60th president and clearly demonstrated the Colombian military’s 
incapacity to confront the guerrillas. 
D. PASTRANA’S HOPE FOR PEACE AND PLAN COLOMBIA 
From 1996 through 1998, elements of the FARC-EP’s “strategic plan” 
seemed to be falling into place as the FARC-EP inflicted a long string of 
humiliating defeats to the Colombian military.  Due to the increased violence and 
the population’s desire for peace, President Pastrana was elected into office in 
August 1998 on the promise of peace negotiations with the FARC-EP.  In his 
inaugural address, Pastrana stated that “peace is the most urgent task on our 
country’s agenda and the best social contract we can make with the future.”38  
Although the track record for negotiations between the government and the  
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FARC-EP over the past two decades was poor,39 Pastrana’s administration was 
extremely optimistic after Víctor Ricardo, President Pastrana’s aide, in June 1998 
met with FARC-EP leaders in the jungles of southern Colombia.   
1. Consolidation of the Zona de Despeje 
Prior to his inauguration, President Pastrana traveled to FARC-controlled 
territory to meet with FARC-EP commander Manuel Marulanda in July 1998, 
where he made some bold overtures in the hopes of developing a favorable 
climate for peace negotiations—the foundation of his presidential campaign.  
After months of attempting to bring the FARC-EP to the negotiating table and a 
series of unprecedented military defeats inflicted upon the armed forces by the 
FARC-EP, President Pastrana fulfilled FARC-EP demands for negotiations on 
November 7, 1998 by creating a demilitarized zone, or zona de despeje (literally 
meaning “cleared zone”).  Withdrawing all security and military personnel from 
five municipalities in the departments of Meta and Caquetá, the FARC-EP was 
granted effective control over a Switzerland-size area in one of its traditional 
strongholds.40  [See Figure 2.1]  With President Pastrana in attendance, peace 
negotiations were formally launched in the despeje in early January 1999; 
however, citing security concerns Marulanda failed to show up to the opening 
ceremony.41  The guerrilla leader’s last-minute no-show embarrassed the 
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president and immediately raised speculation as to the validity of the peace 
process and overall the FARC-EP’s intentions.   
Figure 2.1: Map of the Zona De Despeje in Colombia 
 
Source:  Internet; accessed from 
http://six.swix.ch/farcep/pagina_cultural/N002/zona.html on 11 February 2006. 
 
Throughout the remainder of President Pastrana’s peace efforts, 
numerous peace dialogues would be frozen and cease fires broken.  Within a 
year of launching negotiations, the Pastrana administration’s worst fears were 
realized.  Reports began circulating that the FARC-EP was using the zone to not 
only cultivate coca but also as an unimpeded training ground for its troops—two 
items that were forbidden when the deal was negotiated.42  Despite these reports 
and the lack of reciprocal gestures of peace from the FARC-EP, the Pastrana 
administration continued to extend the despeje’s deadline for close to three 
years.   
Escalating insecurity and guerrilla violence were not the only challenges 
facing Pastrana’s administration.  When President Pastrana took office in August 
1998, he also inherited a seriously deteriorating economy.  The structural reforms 
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initiated by previous administrations coupled with declining prices in the late 
1990s for coffee and oil—two of Colombia’s major exports—continued to 
exacerbate the country’s economic situation.  In the 1990s, Colombia opened its 
traditionally closed economy, while the agricultural sector suffered heavily coca 
cultivation soared—reaching 160,000 hectares in 1999.43  According to the GAO, 
by 1999 Colombia had surpassed Peru and Bolivia as the world’s largest 
producer of coca, had become the source country for over three-fourths of the 
world’s cocaine supply, and was the major supplier of heroin to the eastern 
United States.44  Toward the end of the decade, the national poverty rate 
returned to its 1988 level with 64 percent of the population living in poverty.45  By 
1999, the Colombian economy was experiencing unprecedented levels of 
unemployment (close to 20 percent in major metropolitan areas) and facing 
negative growth for the first time in over 50 years.46  On top of that, Colombia’s 
debt more than doubled during the Samper administration alone, rising from 14.1 
percent of GDP in 1995 to 41.3 percent in 1999.47  This debt and corresponding 
repayment burden, forced the Colombian government to significantly cutback its 
budget, particularly in the critical areas of security and social spending further 
frustrating the government's capacity to solve its country’s problems.      
2. Plan Colombia 
With the economy and the security situation deteriorating and illicit drug 
cultivation on the rise, the Pastrana administration needed a plan of action.  
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Hence, in 1999 President Pastrana unveiled an integrated peace and 
development plan—commonly referred to as Plan Colombia. The plan consisted 
of ten strategic elements (summarized in Appendix A), which focused on the 
achievement of social and economic development while strengthening 
democratic principles and improving overall security.  The proposal called for a 
total investment of $7.5 billion, with the Colombian government pledging $4 
billion and the remaining $3.5 billion anticipated in international aid 
(predominantly from the United States, the European Union, Canada, Japan and 
international financial institutions).   
The U.S. government in July 2000 approved a $1.3 billion supplemental 
assistance package in support of President Pastrana’s Plan Colombia.  U.S. 
assistance—of which 74 percent was allocated to support counter-narcotics 
measures—is reflective of the overriding policy priority of U.S. anti-drug interests 
in the Andean region since the 1980s.48  Plan Colombia aimed to end Colombia’s 
‘civil war’, improve the economy and reduce coca production.  Overall, its 
objectives were broadly defined in the original plan with no priority given to one 
element over another.  However, the actual allocation of funding provides a 
completely different picture.  It is clear from Table 2.1 that U.S. support for 
Colombia in support of Plan Colombia had a predominantly military focus.49  Yet, 
it is important to note that the military assistance portion was only seven percent 
of the original plan.50  With the United States designated to provide a majority of 
that seven percent, many members of the international community retracted their 
pledges of support arguing that they were uncomfortable with what seemed like a 
U.S.-dominated militarized counter-narcotics strategy.51  Nevertheless, the 
                                            
48 Rabasa and Chalk, Colombia Labyrinth, p. 62. 
49 The international community saw the potential for a military escalation of the conflict even 
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called for the creation of two more military counter-narcotics battalions.  See Crandall, Driven By 
Drugs, p. 150. 
50 Gabriel Marcella, “The United States and Colombia: The Journey from Ambiguity to 
Strategic Clarity.”  (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, May 2003), p. 40. 
51 Livingstone, Inside Colombia, p. 128. 
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overall plan was dependent on the support of the international community for 
many of its non-military, or soft, programs.  Without strong international support, 
the United States became the primary source of funding for Plan Colombia.  And 
consequently, those issues that were of most concern to the United States 
(counter-narcotics and security) received the highest priority when the plan was 
finally implemented.  Therefore, it is important to note that the political 
environment and the availability of funds strongly favored those programs which 
supported counter-narcotics objectives, making Plan Colombia predominantly a 
counter-narcotics initiative.   
Table 2.1: Plan Colombia-Assistance for Colombia (US$ in Millions) 
Military Assistance 519.2 
Police Assistance 123.1 
Alternative Development 68.5 
Aid to the Displaced 37.5 
Human Rights 51.0 
Judicial Reform 13.0 
Law Enforcement/Rule of Law 45.0 
Peace Process 3.0 
TOTAL 860.3 
Source:  Crandall, Driven By Drugs, p. 155. 
While the objectives for Plan Colombia differed slightly for Colombia and 
the United States, there is a significant amount of overlap.52  For Colombia, Plan 
Colombia was viewed as a means to promote peace, revive the economy, and 
increase security—all of which were believed to be undermined by the presence 
of illicit drug production and trafficking.  By making “the fight against drug 
production and trafficking one of its top strategic priorities,” Colombia believed it 
could achieve these objectives. 53  The government’s rationale for targeting the 
illicit drug trade was based on the belief that illicit drugs were fueling Colombia’s 
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internal conflict.  Rather than attacking the guerrillas directly, the Colombian 
government hoped to remove the fuel from the fire by attacking what was 
believed to be the guerrilla main source of funding—the illicit drug trade.  It was 
believed that by first removing the fuel from the fire, the Colombian government 
would then be victorious against the dwindling fire.  Hence, an explicit goal of 
Plan Colombia was to reduce the cultivation and processing of narcotics by 50 
percent over the next six years.54   
This focus on counter-narcotics was where U.S. and Colombian interests 
converged.  For the United States, support for Plan Colombia reinforced both 
U.S. foreign and domestic policy objectives.  With respect to U.S. foreign policy, 
the United States had a national security interest in ensuring regional stability 
and security in the Andean region through the promotion of peace and economic 
development.  Yet, the plan’s reliance on supply-sided counter-narcotics 
measures would also coincide with the U.S. domestic policy objective of reducing 
the availability and flow of illicit drugs to the United States.  With almost three-
quarters of the $1.3 billion in U.S. assistance directed toward supply-sided 
counter-narcotics efforts, Plan Colombia is often viewed as an extension of 
Washington’s supply-sided ‘drug war.’55 
In an effort to ‘jump start’ Plan Colombia, government officials in 
Washington and Bogotá drafted an annex to the original plan.  The annex, 
entitled Plan Colombia: Interagency Action Plan, proposed a plan of action for 
the first two years.  Its specific objectives called for programs to strengthen the 
Colombian government’s presence in southern Colombia—where there has been 
an increase in coca cultivation and armed groups—while reducing the 
production, processing and trafficking of illegal drugs in the area.56  The “Push 
into Southern Colombia” program, as it was termed, was the centerpiece of U.S. 
                                            
54 Government of Colombia, Plan Colombia. 
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56 Colombia’s southern departments of Putumayo and Caqueta—which both maintain a 
significant FARC presence—accounted for over one half of all hectares of coca under cultivation 
in Colombia in 2000.    
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assistance, and consequently, the centerpiece of the first phase of Plan 
Colombia.  Plan Colombia’s “Ground Zero” was the department of Putumayo, a 
known stronghold of the FARC as well as an area which witnessed a significant 
increase in coca cultivation in the late 1990s.  Under this program, U.S. funding 
would create and train two additional counter-narcotics battalions in the 
Colombian Army, whose primary mission would be to “secure" Colombia’s 
guerrilla-dominated southern departments so the Colombia National Police could 
conduct counter-drug activities—particularly U.S.-aided drug eradication.57   
Despite the success of the sequential policy when instituted by Peruvian 
President Fujimori in the early 1990s, President Pastrana’s decision to attack the 
drug threat before the insurgency drew a number of criticism.  First, critics argued 
that the dual threat of drugs and terrorism stemmed from the lack of state 
presence in outlying areas.  They believed that if the government could gain 
control of these areas and maintain a formidable presence, it could eliminate not 
only the threat posed by the guerrillas, but also the drug trade.  This is a form of 
the sequential policy just reversed—targets the guerrillas, then the drugs.  A 
second set of critics believed that removing the fuel from the fire was an 
impossible endeavor.  While you could not remove fuel from an already existing 
fire, they believed it was possible both to directly put out the fire and prevent 
additional fuel from further igniting the pre-existing flames.  According to such 
critics, the insurgency has been a thorn in the side of the Colombian government 
since its conception well over forty years ago and to remove one source of its 
funding would only force the organization to capitalize on other prior funding 
sources.  Hence, these critics proposed a simultaneous counter-insurgency 
campaign (to decrease guerrilla presence in outlying areas) and a counter-
narcotics campaign (targeting a major source of guerrilla funding).      
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E.   URIBE’S HARD-LINE STANCE 
From 2000-2002, the number of armed attacks by the FARC-EP increased 
considerably, particularly with the dissolving of the zona de despeje by President 
Pastrana in February 2002.  In 2002, public frustration with the ill-fated peace 
process had grown as attacks on civilians and infrastructure by the FARC-EP 
since mid-January made war or peace the primary vote-determining issue in the 
mid-year presidential election. The mid-year presidential elections in 2002 also 
served as grounds for increased attacks by the FARC-EP, who sought to 
challenge the electoral process through intimidation and violence.  The landslide 
victory of Álvaro Uribe Vélez in the 2002 presidential elections was no exception 
as the FARC-EP attempted to assassinate him three times in the six months 
leading up to the May elections.  Uribe’s commitment to end Colombia’s 
decades-old civil war by taking a hard-line stance against armed groups, 
particularly the FARC-EP, may have won him the election but it did not sit well 
with the guerrillas.  Upon taking office on August 7, 2002, President Álvaro Uribe 
experienced first-hand the FARC-EP’s strength and extended reach as his 
inauguration was overshadowed by an unprecedented urban mortar attack by the 
guerrillas attempting to kill him. 
President Uribe made combating the insurgents an overriding priority and 
defining objective of the Colombian government.  His administration’s commitment 
to end Colombia’s violent history is exhibited in its security policy entitled the 
Democratic Security and Defense Policy (DSP).  The underlying principles 
behind the strategy are to regain control of Colombia’s ungoverned spaces and 
provide an increased level of security to all sectors of society by establishing or 
reinstating the rule of law throughout the country.58  According to the policy, 
terrorism is viewed as the main threat to peace and democracy in Colombia.59  
The main component of the strategy has been to develop and improve the 
capabilities and capacity of the Colombian armed forces and police units and 
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(Bogotá, COL: Ministry of Defence, 2003), p. 9.   
59 Ibid., p. 3. 
  30
deploying them across the country to challenge the guerrillas—a policy which has 
been primarily funds through U.S. aid and a one-time “security tax” on upper-
income individuals and corporations.  The increased military expenditures have 
been also augmented by a significant expansion in the eradication of illicit 
crops—mainly through the extension of the aerial spraying campaign.  This 
expansion of the drug war aims to deny revenues to guerrillas and paramilitary 
organizations as well as reduce coca and opium cultivation.  The DSP also 
increased protection of Colombia’s oil and natural gas pipelines, which the guerrillas 
often threatened attacks against for extortion purposes.60  With a majority of its 
emphasis directed at security programs and counter-narcotics, Uribe’s 
Democratic Security and Defense Policy complements a number of objectives 
originally developed in Plan Colombia.      
The attacks of September 11, 2001, placed terrorism at the forefront of 
U.S. policy.  In response, the United States launched an initiative entitled the 
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)—a protracted struggle against terrorist and 
those state and/or organizations that aided them.  When Colombia was included 
in the GWOT, it brought a major policy shift with regards to the allocation of U.S. 
assistance in Colombia.  By mid-2002, the U.S. Congress had changed the law 
governing aid destined for Colombia, now allowing all previous aid given solely 
for counter-narcotics efforts to be used in a “unified” campaign against 
Colombian guerrillas and paramilitaries—organizations who were already on the 
State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO).  
In the beginning of 2004, the role of the United States in Colombia 
expanded considerably as it became involved with Plan Patriota.  Plan Patriota, 
the military component of Plan Colombia, has been fundamental to President 
Uribe’s DSP.  It represents a complex joint military effort between the U.S. and 
Colombia. Plan Patriota, implemented by Colombian forces and assisted by U.S. 
military advisors, is aimed offensively targeting the FARC-EP and recapturing 
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FARC-EP-controlled territory primarily in southern Colombia.  This offensive is 
the possibly the largest and most sophisticated military offensive carried out in 
the country by either side during 40 years of insurgency and counter-insurgency. 
The initial military offensive against the FARC-EP took place from June 
through December 2003, resulting in the removal of the FARC-EP from Bogotá 
and Cundinamarca Department surrounding the capital.  In early January 2004, a 
second offensive called Operation New Year was launched in the department of 
Caquetá against the FARC-EP’s 15th Front.  This operation ended in December 
2006 but not before expanding to include the attempted removal of FARC-EP 
forces from the Meta, Guaviare, and Antioquia departments.61  On 01 December 
2006, President Uribe blessed Plan Victoria, a strategy that will replace Plan 
Patriota.  Plan Victoria will be the hallmark of the security policy for the next four 
years.  According to open source reporting, approximately “14,300 troops will 
participate in this new campaign in the south, 3,000 less than in the first phase 
but with increased air and river support.”62  Unlike Plan Patriota, there will be less 
battalions, more mobility, and fixed bases in towns previously recovered by the 
Army (e.g., Miraflores and Calamar (Guaviare)).63  
Along with his counter-insurgency campaign, President Uribe intensified 
the Washington-funded war on drugs as Colombia continued to set records in 
hectares of coca eradicated (both aerial and manually) and interdictions.  Despite 
these record-setting figures and increased security throughout the country, 
President Uribe’s simultaneous strategy is beginning to witness diminishing 
returns (particularly with regard to the war on drugs).  Overwhelmingly reelected 
to a second-term in May 2006 (a first in the nation’s history), President Uribe will 
be hard-pressed during his second term to outperform the strides his 
simultaneous campaign against drugs and insurgency made during his first term 
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as resources and funding for future counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency 
operations become strained.  While proponents of President Uribe’s 
simultaneous campaign contend that guerrilla involvement in the drug trade 
makes it impossible to separate the two, critics of this method point out that while 
separating the threats may be difficult, the division of resources to combat the 
dual threat simultaneously actually reduces the strength and ability of the 
government to effectively eliminate either threat.   
F.   SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a foundation for understanding the ongoing conflict 
in Colombia from a historical perspective.  The origins of the Colombia’s 
decades-old civil are deeply rooted in political and social issues stemming from 
the early twentieth century, not the drug trade.  However, the shift in the 
cultivation of coca from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia in the 1990s significantly 
contributed to the escalation of the conflict.  Revenues from all aspects of the 
illicit drug trade fueled increased guerrilla activity and growth, thereby, 
exacerbating conflict within Colombia.  President Pastrana and President Uribe 
each had a distinctly different strategy for attacking the dual threat facing 
Colombia.  The next two chapters will analyze the results and impact of these 



















III. IMPACT ON COUNTER-NARCOTIC OBJECTIVES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Reducing and ultimately cutting the flow of illegal drugs to the United 
States has been a top priority for the U.S. government since the 1980s.  To 
achieve this objective, the U.S. government has emphasized targeting the drug 
supply at critical points along the grower-to-user chain linking the consumer in 
the United States to the grower in a source country.  This strategy continues to 
be a main component of the U.S. government’s policy towards many Latin 
American countries.  President Nixon proclaimed the initial ‘War on Drugs’ more 
than three decades ago, from which time the United States has repeatedly 
pressured drug source countries in Latin America to curb the flow of illegal drugs.  
President Reagan reaffirmed Nixon’s ‘War on Drugs’ in 1982 by declaring drugs 
a threat to the national security of the United States.64  This declaration 
intensified the pressure exerted by the United States on its hemispheric 
neighbors, particularly the Andean countries of South America, to combat their 
country’s illicit drug cultivation and production.  President Bush, Sr. in 1989 
declared that the “gravest domestic threat facing our nation today is drugs,” and 
announced the “Andean Strategy” to reduce the amount of illicit drugs entering 
the United States.65  As a strong proponent of supply-side drug policy, the United 
States has offered numerous aid packages to Andean countries over the last 
three decades for their support in counter-narcotics efforts.   
One such country is Colombia, whose involvement in the illicit drug 
industry gained them notoriety in the 1970s with the production of cannabis.  In 
the 1980s, Colombia became the world’s main producer and supplier of cocaine.  
By the 1990s, with increased U.S.-funded interdiction and eradication efforts in 
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Peru and Bolivia, Colombia began substituting its imported coca base with 
domestic sources as it developed into the world’s largest coca growing nation.  
Coca cultivation in Colombia rose by 187 percent from 1989 to 2000, increasing 
from 42,400 hectares to 122,000 hectares respectively.66  Today Colombia is the 
only country where the three main plant-based illegal drugs are produced in 
significant amounts and the source of 70 percent of the world’s cocaine.   
In recent years, Colombia has become the leading recipients of U.S. 
financial aid.  This increased assistance began, in part, to the U.S. government’s 
approval in July 2000 of a $1.3 billion supplemental assistance package in 
support of Plan Colombia—an integrated strategy originally developed by 
Colombia’s former President Pastrana (1998-2002) to confront a number of 
problems facing Colombia.  U.S. assistance—of which 74 percent was allocated 
to support counter-narcotics measures—reflected the overriding policy priority of 
U.S. anti-drug interest in the Andean region since the 1980s.67  However, 
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. assistance expanded 
beyond counter-narcotics support to include counter-terrorism.  Expansion of 
U.S. assistance coincided with the implementation of President Uribe’s 
Democratic Security and Defense Policy—a policy which directly targets the 
armed insurgents while maintaining the aggressive counter-narcotics policies 
implemented under Plan Colombia.   
This chapter will analyze the impact of counter-narcotics efforts 
implemented under Plan Colombia, both before 2002 (when U.S. assistance and 
most of the Colombian government’s efforts were strictly driven by counter-
narcotics efforts) and after 2002 (when U.S. assistance and Colombian 
government efforts supported a unified campaign against both drugs and 
terrorism).  It will argue that while Plan Colombia witnessed a substantial decline 
in the amount of coca under cultivation from 2000 to 2002, the returns on 
increased eradication efforts since 2003 seem to be diminishing.  This is partially 
due the lack of coordination between eradication and alternative development as 
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well as improved techniques utilized by farmers to protect their crops from 
fumigation.  It will also argue that the decreases in cultivation within Colombia 
has overshadowed a number of unintended consequences and discouraging 
trends (i.e. environmental degradation, increases in the amount of “attempted” 
cultivation, and the geographic shifts in cultivation both within Colombia and the 
Andean region in general).  Finally, this chapter will argue that the number of 
hectares of coca in Colombia is a poor indicator of the effectiveness of U.S. 
supply-side counter-narcotics policy.  Despite record levels of eradication and 
interdiction, Plan Colombia has failed to decrease the flow of illicit drugs to the 
United States—one of the underlying objectives for U.S. support of Plan 
Colombia.  
B. THE AERIAL ERADICATION CAMPAIGN 
One measure of effectiveness proposed by the Colombian government for 
Plan Colombia was a 50 percent reduction in the cultivation and production of 
illicit drugs over a six-year period.68  To meet this goal, emphasis was placed on 
eradication, both voluntary and forced.  While eradication and alternative farming 
programs were both in place prior to the implementation of Plan Colombia, this 
initiative significantly increased the funding allocated for aerial spraying, 
traditionally the cornerstone of American supply-side counter-drug policy.  Based 
upon statistics alone, it would appear that Plan Colombia was a success.  
According to the United Nations, Plan Colombia has decreased coca cultivation 
in Colombia by 47 percent (or by 77,000 hectares) since its initial implementation 
in 2000.69  [See Figure 3.1]  This decrease corresponds to an intensification of 
the aerial eradication campaign—which is a significant component of Plan 
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- 47 % 
Figure 3.1: Coca Cultivation In Colombia 1994 – 2005 (in hectares) 
 
Source: UNODC, Colombia: Coca Cultivation Survey 2005, p. 10. 
A substantial portion of the decrease in coca cultivation, or 61,000 
hectares, in Colombia occurred during Plan Colombia’s initial phase—a time 
when the plan’s focus was purely counter-narcotics driven.  Even more indicative 
of the success of Plan Colombia’s “Push into Southern Colombia” is that the 
largest reductions in coca cultivation during this period occurred in the southern 
departments of Putumayo and Caquetá—the two departments where the aerial 
fumigation campaign was the most intense.  In 2000, over 50 percent of 
Colombia’s coca was grown in the departments of Putumayo and Caquetá, with 
a total of 66,022 and 26,603 hectares, respectively.70  By the end of 2002, 
cultivation in these two departments decreased to 22,137 hectares of coca 
(13,725 hectares in Putumayo and 8,412 hectares in Caquetá), representing only 
22 percent of the nation’s total cultivation.71   
In 2002, the total number of hectares of coca eradicated substantially 
increased to 122,695—a 45 percent increase from 2001.  While the eradication 
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campaign maintained record levels of hectares sprayed following 2002 [see 
Figure 3.2], the change in coca cultivation in Colombia was statistically 
insignificant by the end of 2005, with the United Nations reporting no change and 
the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) estimating a 
decrease of eight percent, or 8,600 hectares in the areas traditionally imaged and 
surveyed since 2002.  However, ONDCP reported 39,000 additional hectares of 
coca in Colombia was observed in newly imaged areas in 2005 (outside the 2004 
survey area).72  The ratio of hectares sprayed to hectares reduced has increased 
since 2002, an indication that the aerial eradication campaign is on a path of 
diminishing returns.  Rather than deterring farmers to plant coca, eradication 
efforts seem to be encouraging farmers to plant more coca in anticipation of 
potential loss due to eradication.  The State Department’s annual International 
Narcotics Control Strategy Report statistics for Colombia clearly highlights this 
observation.  The report delineates how much coca the Colombian government 
has eradicated each year plus how much coca they estimate was left over.  
Adding these two numbers together, gives a rough estimate as to how much 
Colombians have attempted to plant each year.  [See Table 3.1]  As fumigation 
has increased, the estimated overall cultivation, or ‘attempted’ cultivation, has 
risen sharply.  As more is sprayed, more is planted—54 percent more just since 
Plan Colombia began in 2000. 
The increase in attempted cultivation is partially due to the fact that the 
aerial eradication campaign may not have actually reduced the supply of cocaine 
as farming techniques continue to adjust to fumigation efforts.  After numerous 
years of spraying, it has been observed that farmers are covering their coca 
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leaves with sugar-cane syrup or pruning the fumigated bushes so they will 
continue to grow after fumigation.  Coca farmers are also increasing the density 
of their coca bushes, utilizing new fertilizers, and implementing leaf picking 
systems as measures to increase their productivity.73  Another factor that 
contributes to the ineffectiveness of the aerial eradication campaign is the 
“decrease of the average size of coca fields since 2001.”74  In 2003, 93 percent 
of all coca fields were less than three hectares.75  By the end of 2005, the 
average coca field size decreased even further to 1.13 hectares.76  Although the 
U.S. Department of State claims that aerial spraying is precise, smaller fields 
make it extremely difficult for both detection and eradication to be accurate. 
Figure 3.2: Comparison of Net Coca Cultivation and Accumulated Sprayed 











Source: UNODC, Colombia: Coca Cultivation Survey 2005), p. 82. 
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Table 3.1: Coca Cultivation in Colombia, 1999-2005 (in hectares) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Potential 
Harvest 122,500 136,200 169,800 144,450 113,850 114,000 144,400
a 
Aerial 
Eradication 43,246 47,371 84,251 122,695 132,817 136,555 138,775 
Estimated  
Cultivation 167,746 183,571 254,051 267,145 246,667 250,555 283,175 
a This figure includes the additional 39,000 hectares coca found in 2005.  See footnote #9 for 
further information. 
 
Source: United States Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports 
covering 2005 and 2006. 
According to the U.S. Department of State, verification flights continue to 
indicate a high degree of planting in previously sprayed fields.77  Therefore, it 
must be noted that the decline in cultivation cannot be fully attributed to the aerial 
eradication campaign.  In fact, according to the governor of Putumayo, nearly 
one half of the decrease in coca cultivation (14,296 hectares) in the Putumayo 
department in 2002 was accomplished through manual eradication and 
alternative development.78  Suggesting that manual eradication coupled with 
alternative development is a more effective and sustainable method of 
eradication than aerial spraying.  Manual eradication, in itself, is often viewed as 
more effective than aerial eradication because it guarantees the complete 
physical destruction of the crop, not just one harvest.  Manual eradication may be 
slow, labor intensive, and subject to FARC-EP ambushes, but it has a longer-
lasting effect than aerial eradication.  Plus, manual eradication involves a long-
term presence of government security force on the ground and places the 
government in contact with civilian populations in areas it previously abandoned.  
Since 2002, this strategy has been realized and implemented by President Uribe 
as both funding for alternative development and manual eradication figures are 
on the rise.  [See Table 3.2]   
                                            
77 United States Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2003 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 2003), p. IV-19. 
78 Latin American Working Group, “Explore the Issue:  The Numbers Game—Coca 
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Table 3.2: Eradication (in hectares) and Alternative Development (in 
thousands of dollars) for Colombia, 2000 – 2006 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Aerial 
Eradiation 47,000 84,250 122,695 127,000 136,555 138,775 160,000
a 
Manual 
Eradication N/A N/A N/A 21,000 27,159 31,285 42,111 
Alternative 
Development b N/A N/A 49,400 54,900 60,844 70,694 83,257 
a This figure represents estimate for 2006 as stated by the Office of National Drug Control Policy 
in the National Drug Control Strategy 2007. 
b  The alternative development figures represent funding allocated by USAID. 
Sources:  United States Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports 
2001 – 2006; Internet; accessed from http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/ on 10 March 2006 and 
United States Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs, Fiscal Year 2007 Congressional Budget Justification (Washington, D.C.: Department of 
State, April 2006). 
In 2005, the Government of Colombia (GOC) initiated Mobile Eradication 
Groups (GMEs) as part of their manual eradication program.  These groups were 
composed of 30 civilians who, under the protection of the National Police and the 
Army, traveled deep into areas where coca and opium crops proliferated to 
manually eradicate them.  By the end of 2005, the GOC increased the number of 
these 30-member groups to 60.79  Following domestic and international 
opposition to fumigating key national parks and indigenous reserves (deemed 
safe havens for narco-terrorists), President Uribe opted to launch a massive 
manual eradication operation in January 2006.  This eradication offensive, called 
Operation Colombia Verde (or Green Colombia) was launched on January 19, 
2006 in one of Colombia’s largest national park, Sierra de la Macarena National 
Park, using the GMEs. Within the first couple of weeks of implementation, the 
eradication teams were attacked eight times by the guerrillas.  Since February 
2006, these eradication teams have drop from a force of 930 to 111 by April 
2006, primarily out of fear of future guerrilla attacks.80  The offensive culminated 
on August 3, 2006 following the death of five members of the GME, killed by a 
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high power land mine camouflaged amongst the coca bushes.81  President Uribe 
then announced the resumption of aerial fumigation of the remaining coca crops 
in the park.  This effort strongly reinforces the need for the Colombian 
government to control and secure the area of operations as a prerequisite to the 
program’s implementation—a primary reason why Plan Colombia has depended 
on the aerial eradication campaign over manual eradication.   
1. Environmental and Health Consequences 
Despite the estimated decrease in cultivation since 2000, there were a 
number of less obvious side effects associated with the intense aerial fumigation 
campaign.  The first and most obvious is the environmental degradation caused 
not only by chemical run-offs into streams, but also from further destruction of the 
Amazon eco-system.  As more and more land is fumigated, drug producers 
continue to push further into the Amazon, where detection and fumigation efforts 
are difficult to conduct.  Cultivation of coca and the processing of cocaine in 
these areas cause even greater harm to the environment.  According to research 
cited by the International Crisis Group, “for every hectare cultivated, three to four 
hectares of forest have been destroyed, while water and soil have been largely 
contaminated due to the many chemicals used in processing coca leaf.”82   
The second unintended consequence is the effect that the aerial spraying 
campaign has on legal crops and animals.  In fact, herbicides do not only kill 
coca, but also any plants it may come in contact with.  Although the campaign 
originally targeted only large-scale plots of coca (three hectares or more), by 
2002 this distinction had been abolished.83  Plots of coca intermixed with legal 
crops have become legitimate targets since 2002, thereby, increasing the 
number of legal crops destroyed by fumigation.  U.S. and Colombian 
governments view farmers who intersperse food and illegal crops as criminals, 
and therefore, are not worthy or eligible for compensation or aid.  Unfortunately, 
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there have also been numerous accounts where spraying has destroyed a 
number of alternative development projects and resulted in the death of cattle 
and other farm animals.84  An inter-governmental commission led by the 
Colombian Government Ombudsman observed such damages up to 150 feet 
from the nearest coca field.85  These continual errors on behalf of the aerial 
fumigation campaign has contributed to the view upheld by many farmers that 
you’re “sprayed if you do [plant coca], sprayed if you don’t.”86  This sort of 
collateral damage is not going to win the government the necessary support it 
needs from the rural population to defeat the insurgents.   
2. Internal “Balloon Effect” 
The third unintended consequence is what some drug academics have 
termed the “balloon effect”—a term that refers to squeezing one part of a balloon 
only to see it bulge elsewhere.  This term has been used to describe the 
tendency of drugs popping-up in new areas in response to forced eradication 
campaigns.  Although there was a significant decrease in coca cultivation in 
Colombia overall from 2000-2005, especially within the Putumayo department, 
these figures are somewhat misleading because they mask shifts in cultivation 
both within Colombia and to other Andean nations.   
As noted earlier, the most significant decreases in coca cultivation within 
Colombia in 2002 occurred in the departments of Putumayo and Caquetá—
where approximately 80 percent of the aerial campaign was directed.  Yet, 
according to the 2003 United Nations Survey, coca cultivation has witnessed a 
large-scale geographic shift to the neighboring departments of Nariño and 
Guaviare.  The increase in Nariño is of particular significance because, prior to 
the implementation of Plan Colombia, Nariño only accounted for 6 percent of 
Colombia’s national total.  By 2002, Nariño was the second leading coca growing  
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department (15 percent of the national total) behind Guaviare (27 percent).87  
The rise of coca cultivation in Nariño and Guaviare signify that a significant 
number of farmers in the Putumayo region have migrated and are re-planting 
elsewhere.  This is an ironic development considering that aerial spraying efforts 
in Guaviare in the mid-to-late 1990s originally spurred the shift of coca cultivation 
to Putumayo and Caquetá.88   
From 2003 to 2005, the “balloon effect” was also apparent in Colombia as 
the increased aerial spraying campaign produced only a minimal change in 
Colombia’s overall coca cultivation.  In 2004, decreases in areas with high levels 
of eradication (Putumayo, Nariño, and Guaviare), were countered by increases in 
other departments, to include Meta and Arauca.  In fact, the decrease in 
Guaviare of 6,400 hectares was offset by the increase of 5,900 hectares in its 
neighboring department of Meta—an area not targeted heavily by the aerial 
eradication campaign in 2004.  Despite record high aerial eradication levels in 
the departments of Meta and Nariño in 2005, Meta produced the largest 
percentage of the nation’s coca under cultivation (20%) and Narino came in a 
close second with 16%.89  The Narino department only witnessed a two percent 
drop in the area under cultivation even though it set a record of 57,630 hectares 
eradicated.  Looking at Figure 3.3, the aerial eradication campaign in Narino 
destroyed a large portion of the coca crop (annotated in blue); however, coca 
cultivation increased in other areas of the Narino and in the surrounding 
departments of Putumayo and Cauca (annotated in red).  The increase in 
Putumayo corresponds to a doubling of the area under coca cultivation between 
2004 and 2005, from 4,390 hectares to 8,960 hectares.90  Coca cultivation in 
Putumayo had declined significantly until 2004, but this year’s increase could 
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indicate a return of farmers to coca cultivation.  According to the United Nation’s 
Coca Cultivation Survey, 65 percent of the fields detected in 2005 were new—
indicating the extreme mobility of coca within Colombia and the strong motivation 
of farmers to continue planting it.91    






















Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Government of Colombia, Colombia: 
Coca Cultivation Survey2005 (New York: United Nations, June 2006), p. 12. 
3.   External “Balloon Effect” 
Reductions in coca cultivation in Colombia mean little if the overall 
cultivation levels within the Andean region have remained stable.  According to 
the United Nations and U.S. State Department figures [see Table 3.3], Colombia 
witnessed a decrease of 77,000 hectares and the Andean region overall has 
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observed a decrease (down 28% or 61,400 hectares) since 2000.92   The only 
overall decreases in overall cultivation in the Andean region occurred from 2000-
2003 and since 2003 cultivation in the Andean Ridge has been on the rise, albeit 
slowly. 
Table 3.3: Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region, 1994-2005 (in 
hectares)  
 
Source: UNODC, Colombia: Coca Cultivation Survey 2005, p. 19. 
While UNODC states that Peru and Bolivia observed only marginal 
decreases in 2005, the U.S. Department of State indicates in its International 
Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2006 that both Bolivia and Peru observed 
increases in coca cultivation of 8 and 38 percent, respectively, for 2005.93  And 
according to the State Department’s annual report, Ecuador (which borders 
Colombia’s Putumayo department) has experienced increases in coca cultivation 
within its borders.  In 2005,  
Ecuadorian security forces located and destroyed about 36,160 
cultivated coca plants in small, scattered sites…While not 
commercially significant, the extent of cultivation was about double 
that of 2004.  Together with the discovery of a small, partially 
harvested opium poppy plantation, they suggest that growers are 
testing the feasibility of drug crop cultivation in Ecuador.94   
Although these increases are relatively small in terms of hectares, cultivation and 
production in these countries needs to be continually evaluated as Plan 
Colombia progresses.  In fact, the UN Development Program asserted that any 
reductions in coca cultivation within Colombia should not be considered a 
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success, but rather the “fundamental lag time in the balloon effect while the crops 
are reestablished throughout the region.”95  If coca cultivation continues to rise in 
neighboring countries, clearly, any decline in Colombian coca cultivation may not 
be a sign of a successful U.S. strategy.    
C. OTHER COUNTER-NARCOTICS EFFORTS 
While the main thrust of anti-drug efforts associated with Plan Colombia 
have been in the form of eradication, the Plan did recognize the need to carry out 
other forms of counter-drug efforts—to include alternative development and 
interdiction.  Plan Colombia expanded and supported a number of interdiction 
programs already in place; however, it failed to adequately link alternative 
farming programs to the eradication campaign.  Despite recent increases in 
alternative development aid, the program has suffered from a lack of initial 
funding.  The steady increase in aerial spraying in the last decade makes it 
abundantly clear that forced eradication when not combined with alternative 
development will not discourage farmers from growing coca.   
1. Alternative Development 
Plan Colombia did recognize the need to link alternative farming programs 
to its intense eradication campaign.  These measures resemble the “carrot and 
stick” approach which attempt to shift peasant farmers to alternative crops in 
regions where coca is historically grown.96  Since funding for the plan was initially 
skewed toward security, alternative development programs were initially lacking 
adequate funding.  A significant number of families initially volunteered to 
transition to alternative legal crops with the support of government-funded 
alternative agriculture initiatives but they soon went back to growing coca when 
they realized the government would not stand by their word.  Between December 
2000 and July 2001, 33 eradication pacts involving 37,775 families were signed 
in nine districts of the Putumayo region.  By March 2002, 21 percent of the aid for 
food security project had been delivered and only 24 percent of the total number 
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of families committed to the pacts had received full or partial delivery of their 
promised aid.97  In principle, these pacts and food security projects were 
necessary elements of a successful alternative development project.  The failure 
of the government to deliver aid and supplies cast a number of doubts in farmers’ 
minds as to the viability of the programs, thereby, forcing them to revert back to 
illicit crops despite their willingness to change.98 
Funding was but one problem associated with the alternative development 
program in Colombia.  Since Plan Colombia began in 2000, substantial lack of 
coordination between fumigation and alternative development programs has 
developed.  Data released by the United Nations in Colombia: Coca Cultivation 
Survey for 2004 indicates that spraying is not going hand-in-hand with alternative 
development.  As Table 3.4 points out, in several of the departments with the 
most coca and the most spraying, investments in alternative development have 
been minimal at most.  In Guaviare, the second most sprayed department in the 
country, only $500,000 has been dedicated to alternative development efforts 
and Nariño, the third most sprayed department, has only seen $11 million.  A 
successful strategy needs to incorporate both sticks (eradication) and carrots 
(alternative development).  Such poor implementation decisions severely 
hindered the government’s relations with the rural populace, even driving some 
into the arms of the insurgents.  As eradication efforts increased, many farmers, 
instead of shifting to legal crops, simply migrated.  Those farmers, who did 
remain attempting to grow alternative crops, continued to complain of the 
inadequacy of governmental support for these programs. 
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Table 3.4: Spraying vs. Alternative Development in Top Seven Coca 








Putumayo 138,812 148,751 $54,500,000 
Guaviare 96,485 108,686 $500,000 
Nariño 63,750 100,837 $11,000,000 
Meta 63,324 19,249 $4,700,000 
Caquetá 63,261 76,924 $5,800,000 
Nortede Santander 30,992 48,586 $47,900,000 
Vichada 27,521 4,357 $0 
Source: UNODC, Colombia: Coca Cultivation Survey 2004. 
Many of the alternative development initiatives that were funded faced a 
number of difficulties since the areas of concern were typically remote areas with 
poor soil and in regions with the least amount of government authority and 
presence.  Alternative crop programs are clearly necessary in the implementation 
of an effective counter-narcotics program.  However, the underlying reality is that 
most Colombian peasants can make from four to more than ten times the income 
from cultivation of coca than they could make from the cultivation of legal 
crops.99  Even when faced with the possibility of aerial fumigation, many, if not 
most, peasants are willing to take the risk.  The poor soil that is not suitable for 
most crops works well for both the coca plant and poppies.  Other factors which 
favor the cultivation of coca are the short time window before the first harvest, the 
large potential production from each plant, and the characteristics of the 
market.100  Most coca plants can provide an initial harvest at 18 months and 
sustain maximum harvest yields at three years.  A mature and well-maintained 
coca plant can be harvested up to six times per year and produce leaves for up 
to 25 years.101  The marketing of coca is also less burdensome than legal crops.  
Coca leaves, unlike legitimate crops, can be preserved for extended periods of 
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time and typically farmers do not have to deal with the cost of transportation as 
the buyers (drug traffickers) typically purchase the coca directly from the farmers.   
Although alternative development funds were initially skewed due to 
increased security and eradication efforts, President Uribe under his Democratic 
Security and Defense Policy has substantially increased the allotment of funding 
for alternative development.  President Uribe’s increased effort to target the 
guerrillas is a necessary step toward increasing security within the country.  By 
increasing security and his establishment of the Coordination Center for 
Integrated Action (CCIA)—an “interagency organization to reestablish 
governance in previously ungoverned spaces of Colombia through synchronizing 
military operations with the operations of other ministries”—the Uribe 
administration seems to be addressing a number of issues that have plagued the 
implementation of alternative development projects in the past.102  The increased 
importance placed on alternative development by President Uribe can also be 
observed in his expansion of the Forest Ranger program—which pays rural 
families to pull up any coca and maintain an area coca-free in areas where the 
eco-system is fragile (i.e., national parks).103  As measures of security continue 
on a downward trend and control is established in remote areas where coca has 
traditionally flourished, alternative development needs to continue to be pushed 
to the forefront of Colombian policy.     
2. Interdiction 
Effective interdiction efforts require a significant amount of coordination 
and intelligence.  Besides establishing two additional counter-narcotics 
battalions, a portion of U.S. aid has been dedicated to technical assistance, 
training, and equipment for Colombia’s armed forces and police enabling them to 
seize, destroy, and disrupt the trafficking of illicit crops.  According to the 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2006, Colombia had a record 
                                            
102 United States Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2006, 
p. 90 and p. 102. 
103 Ibid. 
  50
year with respect to interdiction efforts—with Colombia’s police and military 
forces captured 223 metric tons of cocaine and cocaine base in 2005.104  
While governmental agencies continue to insist that interdiction efforts 
have resulted in record number of arrests and seizures, it is obvious that police 
and military seizures would increase if more personnel were directed at the 
problem.  However, what is being observed is an adaptation to interdiction.  Just 
like in the 1990s when the U.S. put a significant amount of pressure on 
interdiction efforts from the Caribbean route, we began to see Mexico become a 
significant alternative transit route.  It is the same internally in Colombia, 
suppression along one route merely pushes trafficking in another direction.  
While trafficking may be a continuous problem, the improved intelligence 
collection capabilities of the Colombian military and policy as well as 
improvements in mobility have significantly increased their effectiveness to detect 
and destroy drug processing labs as well as intercept processing material.  
Proponents of interdiction efforts cite increased numbers of interdictions and 
arrests as justification for continued program support and increased spending.  
These operations are intended to hit the traffickers where it hurts and decrease 
the supply of cocaine available to be shipped to user countries and/or increase 
its price.  It is extremely difficult to verify that increases in seizures represent an 
actual reduction in illicit drug production and trafficking.  In fact, as will be 
discussed in the next section, the availability and price of cocaine in the United 
States does not indicate that such a reduction has taken place. 
D. IMPACT ON U.S. MARKETS 
The overall decrease in coca cultivation in Colombia since 2000 has been 
praised by the Bush administration as proof that Plan Colombia is a huge 
success.  Despite heavy criticism regarding the unchanged cultivation statistics 
since 2003, U.S. officials continue to contend that Plan Colombia “has had  
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exceptional success in pursuing the goals it established.”105  In fact, when 
Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice spoke in Bogotá in April 2005, she clearly 
acknowledged Plan Colombia as a success and reemphasized the need for its 
continued support by affirming that “you don’t stop in midstream on something 
that has been very effective.”106  However, the number of hectares of coca in 
Colombia is a poor indicator of the effectiveness of U.S. supply-side counter-
narcotics policy.  Despite record high seizures and hectares eradicated, Plan 
Colombia has not decreased the flow of illicit drugs to the United States—one of 
the principle objectives of U.S. supply-sided counter-drug policy. 
1.   Price and Purity 
U.S. supply-side policies aim to reduce the availability of illicit drugs in the 
United States enough to drive up prices and drive down purity.  In theory, these 
higher prices for a lower-quality product would then reduce drug use, both by 
dissuading people from becoming involved with drugs and by prompting those 
who are already using drugs to seek treatment or otherwise cut back on their 
consumption.  In November 2005, John Walters, Director of the Office of National 
Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), stated the “we have seen for the first time a 
decline in the purity of cocaine in the United States and an increase in price at 
the retail level.”107   
Throughout the 1980s, cocaine prices witnessed a substantial decline and 
have been on a gradual decline throughout much of the 1990s with the price of 
cocaine fluctuating between $100 and $200 per gram.  [See Figure 3.4]  
According to Office of National Drug Control Policy, from February 2005 to 
September 2005, the price of a gram of cocaine rose 19 percent, to $170, while 
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the purity level fell 15 percent.  [See Figure 3.5]  Yet, this price increase falls well 
within the average price fluctuations for cocaine over the last decade.  The same 
holds true for purity levels. [See Figure 3.5]  Since the early 1990s, cocaine purity 
levels have fluctuated from 55 to 75 percent.  The new purity levels for cocaine in 
September 2005 (approximately 65 percent) fall within the long-run average of 
the last decade.  Plan Colombia began in 2000 and the ONDCP’s assessment of 
its success, based on eight months worth of data from 2005, is extremely 
premature.  Although it is possible that stockpiles of coca and lag times may 
have been a contributing factor in the inability of the United States to experience 
an increase in price and/or decrease in purity levels until 2005, but this new trend 
has the potential to be merely a short-term fluctuation—similar to those observed 
in 2000.  This trend has not been consistent for a long enough period to provide 
proof of sustained success in U.S. supply-side efforts.  In fact, looking at Figure 
3.4 it seems that price and purity have been merely pushed back to what they 
were in early 2004—four years after the start of Plan Colombia.   













Source:  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2006, p. 368. 
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Figure 3.5: Purity and Price of South American Cocaine  
 
Source: John Walters, Report on Progress in Colombia, 17 November 2005; Internet; accessed  
from http://www.pushingback.com/archives/05nov.html on 12 February 2006. 
2. Availability  
In the National Drug Threat Assessment for 2007, produced by the 
Department of Justice’s National Drug Intelligence Center, states that “despite 
the fact that the highest record level of interdiction and seizures were recorded in 
2005, there have been no sustained cocaine shortages or indications of 
stretched supplies in domestic markets.”108  ONDCP announced in November 
2005 that prices have increased; however, law enforcement reporting throughout 
the first half of 2005 does not reflect a decrease in retail level cocaine 
availability.109  This reporting corresponds with the latest National Drug Threat 
Survey (NDTS) data which shows that the percentage of state and local law 
enforcement agencies reporting high or moderate availability of cocaine in their 
area has not changed appreciably from 2003 through 2005.110  As cocaine 
remains widely available, the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) 
concluded in September 2005 that the number of cocaine users in the United 
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States had remained stable—although high—at roughly two million users.111  
Thereby, indicating that increased supply-side efforts have not transferred into 
reductions in demand.  The monitoring of these figures will be of particular 
importance in the next years as a decrease in drug availability and use in 2006 
may be indicative of price increases and purity reductions experienced in 2005.  
A decrease in availability and use would lend more credibility to the ONDCP’s 
claim that Plan Colombia is finally experiencing success on the streets of the 
United States. 
E.  CONCLUSION 
With respect to its counter-narcotics objectives, Plan Colombia has 
brought mixed results.  According to data provided by the United Nations, 
Colombia achieved its goal of a 50 percent reduction in coca cultivation by the 
end of 2004.  While these statistics are very encouraging, they overshadow a 
number of unintended consequences and discouraging trends. 
The cornerstone of Plan Colombia’s counter-narcotics efforts has been the 
aerial eradication campaign.  The intensification of the fumigation campaign from 
2001 to 2002 contributed substantially to the overall decrease in cultivation.  In 
fact, 73 percent of the overall reduction (or 61,000 hectares) was achieved from 
2000 to 2002—when strategy was driven solely by counter-narcotics.  Despite 
record breaking eradication figures since 2003, the returns seem to be 
diminishing as farming techniques (i.e. coating coca plants with sugar-cane 
syrup, pruning fumigated bushes, etc.) outmaneuver fumigation efforts.  Aerial 
eradication has not only encouraged farmer to plant smaller plots of coca—which 
make detection and eradication efforts more difficult—but has also encouraged 
them to plant more.  This point was reinforced when John Walters, Director of the 
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), acknowledged that in 2004 
“coca growers re-planted and reconstituted their crops faster than we have seen  
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them do in the past.”112  As these new crops transpire, it corroborates the 
“balloon effect.”  That is, when production is squeezed somewhere, it simply 
springs up elsewhere.  As documented in the Colombia: Coca Cultivation 
Surveys conducted by the United Nations, eradication has created geographic 
shifts in cultivation both within Colombia and the entire Andean region in general.  
There are a number of reasons why the aerial eradication effort has not 
deterred coca farmers from planting more coca.  The first reason has to do with 
the initial lack of funding allocated for alternative development.  It was apparent 
from a number of reports originating from the department of Putumayo (the focus 
of Plan Colombia’s initial phase), that a significant amount of farmers were willing 
to transition to legal crops as long as the government provided some form of 
assistance.  The failure of the government to deliver aid and supplies and uphold 
its end of the contract, cast doubts in farmers’ minds as to the viability of such 
programs.  Secondly, there has been consistently a lack of coordination between 
eradication efforts and alternative development.  In several of the departments 
where a majority of the cultivation and spraying is concentrated, alternative 
development has been minimal at most.  The use of purely “stick” strategies (i.e. 
eradication) is not enough to encourage farmers to plant legal crops.  With no 
other alternatives available, many farmers see coca as their only option, and 
therefore, have planted more coca in anticipation of future losses.  Alternative 
development must go hand-in-hand with eradication if counter-narcotics efforts 
are to be successful.   
While the sustained cultivation reductions in the department of Putumayo 
prove the necessity of the carrot and stick approach, it also highlights the 
effectiveness of manual eradication.  In 2002 alone, more than one half of the 
decrease in cultivation in Putumayo was the result of manual eradication coupled 
with alternative development.  Not only does manual eradication ensure 
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complete destruction of the illicit crops but it also initiates a state presence in a 
number of rural areas that have traditionally been abandoned by the Colombian 
government.  Yet, for such projects to be carried out security is a paramount 
concern and often a prerequisite—as illustrated by the recent guerrilla attacks on 
eradication teams in the La Macarena National Park. 
Despite record high seizures and hectares eradicated, Plan Colombia has 
not decreased the flow of illicit drugs to the United States—one of the underlying 
objectives of U.S. support for Plan Colombia.  While minor fluctuations in both 
cocaine prices and purity levels have been observed, these levels are within the 
historic averages for the last decade.  While the recent increase in the price of 
cocaine and the decrease in purity levels may signify that counter-narcotics 
efforts in Colombia are beginning to affect supply, this assessment is still 









IV. IMPACT ON THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF 
COLOMBIA – PEOPLE’S ARMY (FARC-EP) 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
One of the principal problems facing President Pastrana upon taking office 
in August 1998 was the increased level of violence being experienced throughout 
the country.  An underlying fundamental assumption of Plan Colombia was that 
Colombia’s increased violence was fueled by illicit drugs.113  This point is 
reinforced by a 2001 RAND report that insists:   
Current instability in Colombia derives from the interaction and 
resulting synergies stemming from two distinct tendencies: the 
development of an underground criminal drug economy and the 
growth of armed challenges to the state’s authority. …the strength 
of the guerrillas is directly linked to the guerrilla’s control of drug 
producing and drug processing areas.114 
All of Colombia’s armed non-state actors (the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP), National Liberation Army (ELN), and 
the United Self-Defense Forces (AUC)) fund their operations, at least in part, 
from income generated by the illicit drug industry.  In recognition of the relatively 
strong correlation between the strength of armed non-state actors and the 
increasing drug industry, one of the secondary objectives of Plan Colombia was 
to diminish the war-making capacity of these organizations by reducing the 
funding they derived from the illicit drug industry.  The Colombian government 
believed that, by striking the drug trade, it was also striking the economic center 
of gravity of the guerrillas.115  By destroying illicit drug fields, production facilities, 
and transportation networks, the government believed that it could also degrade 
the guerrillas’ ability to continue the war. 
                                            
113 This rationale has been supported by a number of academic scholars.  See Jennifer 
Holmes, Sheila Amin Gutierrez de Pineres, and Kevin Curtin, “Drugs, Violence and Development 
in Colombia: A Department Level Analysis” (Dallas, Tex.: University of Texas Press, 2004). 
114 Rabasa and Chalk, Colombia Labyrinth, p. xii. 
115 Ibid., p. 65. 
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Despite Pastrana’s efforts, high levels of violence continued throughout 
much of Colombia and many Colombians became disenchanted with the fruitless 
results of President Pastrana’s three years of peace negotiations and counter-
narcotic efforts implemented under Plan Colombia.  Hence, in 2002 a hard-right 
candidate, Álvaro Uribe, was elected into office promising to take a hard-line 
stance against the insurgents.  Acknowledging that the situation in Colombia 
required a long-term strategy, the Uribe administration developed a “Democratic 
Security and Defense Policy”—or “unified” campaign against both drugs and 
insurgents.  The main principal behind this strategy was to reinstate the rule of 
law and regain control over the country, thereby, denying sanctuary to armed 
non-state actors —the main perpetrators of violence in Colombia.  President 
Uribe’s strategy also continued and expanded counter-narcotic efforts initiated 
under the Pastrana administration—especially the aerial eradication campaign.  
With Uribe’s Democratic Security and Defense Policy primarily focused on 
security and counter-narcotics operations, its objectives are complementary to a 
number of those laid out in Plan Colombia.  
This chapter will attempt to determine the impact of Plan Colombia’s 
“Push into Southern Colombia” (2000-2002) and President Uribe’s Democratic 
Security and Defense Policy (2003-2005) on the strength of the FARC-EP, one of 
the main perpetrators of violence in Colombia.  Since strength is an ambiguous 
and relative term, the strength of the FARC-EP will be measured both 
quantitatively and qualitatively by evaluating changes in the organization’s area 
of influence, membership numbers as well as composition, activities (or 
operations tempo), popular support, strategies and tactics, revenues, and 
relationships with other state and non-state actors.  
It will argue that while Plan Colombia’s “Push into Southern Colombia” did 
reduce the number of hectares of coca cultivation, its impact on the FARC-EP 
was negligible.  Plan Colombia did not substantially weaken the FARC-EP, as 
proponents contested, nor did it strengthen the organization, as critics of 
government efforts have charged.  The illicit drug industry was not the FARC-
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EP’s center of gravity but rather one of many enablers in funding its operations.  
As a result, reductions in coca cultivation had little impact on the FARC’s 
capacity to act.  Although the targeting of the illicit drug industry, primarily 
through aerial eradication, may have slightly increased the FARC-EP’s support 
based, it was not the over-arching cause for an increase in FARC-EP strength 
prior to 2002.  Rather, the peace negotiations conducted with the FARC-EP by 
the Pastrana administration (1998-2002) undermined the secondary objective of 
Plan Colombia’s “Push into Southern Colombia”—to decrease the war-making 
capability of the FARC-EP.  In fact, this chapter will argue that actions 
undertaken by the Pastrana administration in the name of peace facilitated an 
increase in the FARC-EP’s strength prior to 2003.   
Finally, this chapter will acknowledge that President Uribe’s “unified” 
strategy against drugs and insurgents has marginally diminished the threat posed 
by the FARC-EP.  The reorganization and fortification of the Colombian military—
which was originally instituted by the Pastrana administration and continued by 
President Uribe—enabled the military to go on the offensive against the FARC-
EP resulting in a decrease in estimates of FARC-EP forces.  While the overall 
number of guerrilla attacks is down, the FARC-EP still exerts some amount of 
control over approximately one third of Colombian territory and remains a 
formidable threat to the Colombian state.  
B. THE PASTRANA ADMINISTRATION 
As mentioned earlier, an underlying fundamental assumption of Plan 
Colombia was that Colombia’s increased violence was fueled by illicit drugs.  
Plan Colombia’s initial focus on the southern departments of Colombia—a 
FARC-EP-dominated area which witnessed a number of devastating insurgent 
attacks from 1996-1998—strongly suggested that the government’s initial 
concern was focused on the threat posed by the FARC-EP.  In Chapter III it was 
acknowledged that Colombia witnessed a substantial decline in the amount of 
coca under cultivation from 2000 to 2002, primarily a direct result of the intense 
aerial fumigation campaign.  According to proponents of Plan Colombia, 
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decreases in FARC-EP strength should correlate with the reported decreases in 
cultivation if, in fact, the illicit drug industry is the FARC-EP’s economic center of 
gravity.  However, opponents of Plan Colombia’s initial phase contended that the 
intense aerial fumigation campaign would drive peasants into the hands of the 
guerrillas, as was observed in Peru a decade earlier. 
This section will review the impact of Plan Colombia (2000-2002) on the 
strength of the FARC-EP.  Looking at changes in the FARC-EP’s base of 
support, its relationship with internal actors and the organization’s sources of 
economic sustainability will assist in determining if FARC-EP strength actually 
decreased as a result of counter-narcotics efforts directed in FARC-controlled 
areas.  It will argue that while the “Push into Southern Colombia” may have 
forced some disgruntled and economically desperate coca farmers to join the 
ranks of the FARC-EP, this phenomenon was not a common occurrence.  The 
change in roles and relationships between the FARC-EP and the cocaleros (or 
coca growers) as well the FARC-EP’s employment of brutal violence against the 
local populous proved to be detrimental to their popular support.  It will also 
argue that Plan Colombia only minimally affected the FARC-EP’s economic 
base.  The granting of the zona de despeje by President Patrana would 
ultimately prove to be a strategic mistake as it gave the FARC-EP the opportunity 
to capitalize further on the illicit drug industry in an area uncontested by the state.     
1. Impact on Popular Support for the Guerrillas 
Critics of Plan Colombia often argue that the rise in membership numbers 
for the FARC-EP since 1998 [See Table 4.1] can be attributed to the U.S-backed 
aerial eradication campaign associated with Plan Colombia’s “Push into Southern 
Colombia.  According to the Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement 
(CODHES), a non-governmental agency located in Bogotá, an estimated 
200,000 people were uprooted between 1999 and 2003 as a result of counter-
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narcotics operations directed at the southern provinces in Colombia.116  For 
small farmers who may have been forced to cultivate coca by armed non-state 
actors or out of pure necessity to survive, aerial fumigation can striped them of 
their means of survival.117   
The overall lack of viable alternatives for farmers can place those whose 
fields have been fumigated in a difficult position.  In order to maintain an income 
and provide food for their families, they typically can choose to:  1) relocate to 
another department; 2) plant coca and hope that they will not be fumigated again; 
or 3) join one of the armed groups.  The “balloon effect” predicts that a number of 
farmers are pursuing option one.118  While it is apparent that many farmers have 
moved to other provinces to plant coca, some testimonies received by non-
governmental organizations has confirmed that “young farmers from Putumayo, 
the focus of early spraying efforts, are joining the FARC-EP or the AUC after their 
crops are destroyed by aerial fumigation.”119  It is plausible that fumigation 
programs whose purpose it is to destroy the economic base of the FARC-EP 
may actually be furthering the growth and support the FARC-EP, and the AUC, 
receive from the rural population.  Some peasants whose livelihoods are                                             
116 According to government statistics, in the year 2000 alone 7,428 people were displaced 
in the department of Putumayo.  In 1999—prior to the implementation of Plan Colombia—only 
368 people officially registered as displaced.  This number rose to 17,143 in 2001—over a 200 
percent increase—and to 33,914 (approximately 10 percent of the departments population) in 
2002.  These figures were taken by the Social Solidarity Network, a government agency 
responsible for delivering humanitarian aid to Colombians displaced by the conflict.  It must be 
remembered that these figures only represent those people who are officially registered as 
displaced.  It does not include those who do not register out of fear of retaliation by armed actors 
or those who are not recognized by the agency because they do not possess land titles.  See 
Witness for Peace, “Colombia’s First Two Years,” April 2003, p. 12; Internet; accessed from 
http://www.witnessforpeace.org/pdf/putumayo0403.pdf on 28 November 2005 and Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre, “Colombia: Government Response to IDPs Under Fire as 
Conflict Worsens” Global IDP Project, 27 May 2005, p. 4; Internet; accessed from 
http://www.internal-displacement.org on 11 January 2006.    
117 Individuals who flee from fumigation, however, are generally not considered internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) according to government standards.  They are termed “voluntary 
migrants,” which prevents them from receiving assistance provided to registered IDP households.  
See Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, Colombia’s War on Children (New York, N.Y.: 
Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, February 2004) p. 14; available from 
http://www.watchlist.org/reports/colombia.report.pdf; Internet; accessed on 11 January 2006. 
118 For further information on the “balloon effect” refer to Chapter 3 – Impact on Counter-
narcotics. 
119 Witness for Peace, “Colombia’s First Two Years,” p. 105.  
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threatened by aerial fumigation efforts may view such actions as an attack 
against the peasantry, which only continues to erode the relationship between 
the government and the rural populace (which is already weak in these areas).  
Undoubtedly, anger over fumigation and economic desperation has prompted 
some peasants to join or support the FARC-EP; however, this phenomenon has 
not assumed the substantial proportions it has in other cases like Peru.  The lack 
of peasant mobilization to their cause and the harsh tactics and strategies 
employed by FARC-EP are some of the reason why counter-narcotics efforts did 
not overwhelming pushed peasants into the arms of the FARC-EP.   
Table 4.1: Estimates on FARC-EP Membership120 
Year Colombian Ministry of Defense U.S. Department of State 
1990 5,800 N/A 
1998 11,930 7,000 – 10,000 
2000 N/A 10,000 – 15,000 
2002 16,980 12,000 – 18,000 
2004 12,000 9,000 – 12,000 
Sources:  Nina Serafino, “Colombia: Conditions and U.S. Policy” (Washington, D.C.: CRS Report 
for Congress, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 2001), p. 9; Ana Hutchinson, 
testimony before Committee on International Relations, International Global Terrorism: Its Links 
with Illicit Drugs as Illustrated by the IRA and Other Groups in Colombia, 107th Congress, 2nd 
Session, April 24, 2002, p. 32; U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism  2004 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 2005), p. 109; John A. Cope, “Colombia’s War: Toward a 
New Strategy” in the Institute for National Strategic Studies’ Strategic Forum, no. 194 (October 
2002), Footnote 5 and Stephen Johnson, “Helping Colombia Sustain Progress Toward Peace,” in 
Executive Summary Background, no. 1887 (October 19, 2005), p. 7. 
                                            
120 It is important to note that these numbers do not include the FARC-EP’s urban militia.  
The FARC-EP’s urban militia—its method for making the organization’s presence known and felt 
in the urban areas—in 2002 was estimated to be between 2,500 and 6,000 members and 
consisted primarily of two groups:  the Bolivarian Militia and the Popular Militia.  The difference is 
that the Bolivarian Militia has a military structure and composed of people suited for direct 
physical combat while the Popular Militia is composed of individuals whose age or physical 
condition prevents them from participating in direct combat with the enemy.  The political-military 
roles of these urban groups vary:  “from facilitate the movement of the guerrillas from and to the 
cities; to provide logistical support, medical supplies, ammunition, refuge for wounded 
combatants and weapons; and to extract protection rents from merchants, including those in 
downtown Bogota.”  See Nazih Richani, Systems of Violence, pp. 79-80. 
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Despite these assertions by government critics, it can be contested that 
the expansion of the aerial eradication campaign associated with Plan Colombia 
did not win the FARC-EP popular support.  This is most clearly evident in the lack 
of peasant protests against Plan Colombia, in stark contrast to FARC-backed 
mobilization against government fumigation programs just four years earlier.  In 
1996, the initiation of a U.S.-supported fumigation program in the departments of 
Guaviare and Caquetá, witnessed one of the largest peasant mobilizations of the 
decade—with more than 200,000 participants.121  Backed by the FARC-EP, the 
weeks of marches ended when the Colombian government agreed to carry out 
infrastructure projects, crop substitution programs, and development assistance 
in the affected areas.  These protests showed that the FARC-EP had built an 
impressive support base in a number of rural areas.  Yet, prior to the 
implementation of Plan Colombia, with its focus on aerial fumigation, Colombia 
did not witness a mass mobilization of peasants.  Since the government never 
followed through on its commitments made in response to the 1996 marches, the 
marches were generally regarded as a failure.  A number of the local peasants, 
who lost income from the protests, directed their anger and mistrust not just at 
the Colombian government, but also at the FARC-EP.  As a result, when the 
FARC-EP attempted to mobilize the peasantry against Plan Colombia, their 
efforts not only failed, but may also have been counter-productive.  In Putumayo, 
the FARC-EP imposed a blockade of commercial and transport activity on the 
local population in defiance of the upcoming initiation of Plan Colombia, leading 
some analysts to assert that such actions against the populace have significantly 
eroded the FARC-EP’s support base.122   
a. Relations with the Cocaleros 
The FARC-EP traditionally has received a substantial amount of 
support from Colombia’s cocaleros, or coca growers; however, the FARC-EP’s 
increased involvement in the drug trade has fundamentally altered the                                             
121 Adam Isacson, “The Tragedy of Alternative Development in Colombia,” Colombia Journal 
Online, December 3, 2001; Internet; accessed from 
http://www.colombiareport.org/colombia92.htm on 15 January 2006. 
122 International Crisis Group, “War and Drugs in Colombia,” p. 12. 
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organizations relationship with the cocaleros.  In an interview conducted by Scott 
Wilson (a journalist for the Washington Post) with a farmer in a small village 
within the department of Meta, villagers stated that the FARC-EP was the sole 
buyer of coca.  According to residents, the FARC-EP pays residents $820 per 2.2 
pounds of coca base, which is approximately $150 less than the going rate in 
other regions.123  This indicates a significant shift in the FARC-EP’s relations with 
the cocaleros.  Rather than looking out for the interests of the peasants—as it did 
when if first became involved in the illicit drug industry—the FARC-EP is now 
exploiting them.  In this sense, the FARC-EP is perceived as both a defender and 
a danger to the peasant farmers who cultivate coca as their primary means of 
economic activity.  This phenomenon is further developed in a recent paper 
entitled, “Shooting Up: The Drug Industry and Military Conflict,” by Vanda Felbab-
Brown.  She argues that “belligerent groups are frequently tempted to control the 
entire drug industry in their region, but by doing so they severely compromise the 
political benefits they gain by being protectors of the peasants against 
traffickers.”124  This seems to be precisely what happened to the FARC-EP as it 
increased its involvement in the illicit drug industry in the late 1990s.  The 
mutually beneficial relationship that had previously existed between the FARC-
EP and the cocaleros against a common threat (the narcotraffickers) is no longer 
present.  Without the presence of “thuggish” traffickers, the FARC-EP is able to 
reap the financial income of increased involvement but at the cost of the political 
benefits it derived from the peasants in FARC-dominated coca-producing areas.    
b. Relations with the Paramilitaries 
Although there was an increase in the number of Colombian armed 
forces in the department of Putumayo as a result of Plan Colombia’s “Push into 
Southern Colombia,” this did not translate into an improvement in security for the 
region.  In fact, although it is extremely difficult to find official statistics regarding 
violence specifically within the department of Putumayo (i.e. homicides,                                             
123 Scott Wilson, “Colombia’s Rebel Zone: World Apart; Tour Reveals Force’s Growing 
Isolation,” The Washington Post, Section A, 18 October 2003, p. A01. 
124 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Shooting Up:  The Drug Trade and Military Conflict,” paper 
presented at APSA Annual Meeting 2005, p. 26. 
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disappearances, etc.), interviews conducted by a variety of non-governmental 
organizations have shown that violence has actually increased in the department 
since the onset of Plan Colombia.  In an evaluation conducted by Witness for 
Peace (WFP), a politically independent human rights organization, the 
Colombian health ministry—DASALUD (Departamento Administrativo de 
Salud)—stated that there were at least 307 homicides in Putumayo from January 
to July of 2002, representing an increase of seven percent from the homicide rate 
one year prior to the implementation of Plan Colombia.125  It was also concluded 
by the national Human Rights Ombudsman’s office in October 2002 that “in 
recent months, the security situation in Lower and Middle Putumayo has 
worsened considerably and the presence of illegally armed groups has 
strengthened.”126   
The increased violence in Putumayo was a partial result of the 
arrival and strengthening of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) 
in the region—an umbrella paramilitary organization in Colombia with known 
historic ties to Colombia’s armed forces.  Up until the end of 1997 when the AUC 
announced the creation of its southern bloc, the FARC-EP’s control in the 
Putumayo region went undisputed.  By 2000, the presence of the AUC could be 
felt throughout a number of major urban areas in lower and middle Putumayo, 
including Puerto Asís, La Hormiga, Orito, and El Placer.  While the AUC has 
gained control of a number of urban areas, the FARC-EP continues to control 
most of the rural areas in the lower and middle Putumayo region.  Therefore, 
while it is true that Plan Colombia has weakened the FARC-EP throughout a 
number of urban areas in Putumayo, it has done so by strengthening the AUC, 
not by undermining the FARC-EP’s drug revenues.127   
                                            
125 Witness for Peace, “Plan Colombia’s First Two Years: An Evaluation of Human Rights in 
Putumayo – 2003,” April 2003, p. 6; Internet; accessed from 
http://www.witnessforpeace.org/pdf/putumayo0403.pdf on 28 November 2005. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid., p. 18. 
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There are a number of reasons that contribute to the paramilitary 
take over in regions of southern Colombia.  One factor can be attributed to the 
local population’s growing dissatisfaction with the guerrillas.  Although this 
dissatisfaction goes back to the failed peasant protests in 1996, the FARC-EP 
has not helped the situation by reacting both violently and indiscriminately to the 
paramilitary offensive—often killing more civilians than it does paramilitary forces.  
Historically throughout Colombia violence against civilians has been predominant 
linked to the actions of the paramilitaries.  Yet since the end of 2001 [see Figure 
4.1], guerrilla forces have surpassed the paramilitaries with respect to the 
number of civilian casualties inflicted.128  The increase in civilian casualties 
inflicted by the guerrillas has two explanations: first, is the retaliation against 
those who support the paramilitary incursion into southern Colombia.  Second, 
the FARC-EP has increasingly turned to gas cylinder bombs, which tend to be an 
indiscriminate weapon.  These indiscriminate acts of brutality did not win the 
hearts and mind of the local population. 
Figure 4.1: Civilian Casualties Due to Attacks 
 
Source:  Jorge Restrepo, Michael Spagat, Patrick Reanier, and Nicolás Suárez, “Civilian 
Casualties in the Colombian Conflict: Geo-referencing Human Security,” Paper prepared for the 
Twenty-Fifth Annual ESRI International User Conference, 2004, p. 14. 
                                            
128 Jorge Restrepo, Michael Spagat, Patrick Reanier, and Nicolás Suárez, “Civilian 
Casualties in the Colombian Conflict: Geo-referencing Human Security,” Paper prepared for the 
Twenty-Fifth Annual ESRI International User Conference, 2004, p. 14.  
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2. Consolidation of the Zona de Despeje:  A Strategic Mistake 
The initial phase of Plan Colombia failed to drastically impact the strength 
of the FARC as ongoing political negotiations between the FARC and the 
Government of Colombia further exacerbated the situation.  As previously 
mentioned, after taking office, President Pastrana met FARC-EP demands for 
negotiations by creating a demilitarized zone, or zona de despeje (literally 
meaning “cleared zone”), withdrawing all security and military personnel from five 
municipalities in the departments of Meta and Caquetá.129  [See Figure 2.1]  The 
decision to grant the FARC-EP a sizeable demilitarized zone (DMZ) without 
conditions, while meant as a gesture of good will and “confidence building,” 
would prove to be a critical error on the part of the Pastrana administration as it 
represented a considerable step forward for the insurgents both in terms of its 
geographical dimensions and strategic relevance.  The zona de despeje, which 
was approximately the size of Switzerland, gave the FARC-EP de facto 
recognition as a belligerent and acceptance by the government as the only 
recognized power in the DMZ.  In this sense, the FARC-EP created a scenario 
similar to what existed during the period of the “independent republics” nearly 
four decades ago.  The DMZ was used politically as a means to display to the 
population and the international community its ability to offer a credible alternate 
form of governance.  It also offered a number of military advantages.  The zona 
de despeje militarily gave the insurgents a “safe haven” from which they were 
able to launch numerous attacks against Colombian forces.  It has also been 
reported that the despeje was used by the guerrillas to cultivate coca and train 
troops—two items that were forbidden when the negotiations were made.130  The 
detention of kidnapped victims and the stockpiling of weapons were also 
common in the despeje.131  In granting the despeje, the Pastrana administration 
essentially gave the FARC-EP not only the element of time, but also a means by 
which they could expand and further develop their organization.   
                                            
129 Serafino, Colombia: Current Issues and Historical Background, p. 17-18. 
130 Crandall, Driven By Drugs, p. 73. 
131 Dudley, Walking Ghosts, pp. 172-173. 
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In areas were the FARC-EP has exerted a significant amount de facto 
control (e.g., the despeje), it has been widely criticized for its practice of forced 
recruitment.  In fact, the Colombian press has reported in 2000 that the FARC-
EP publicly stated that all persons between the ages of 13 and 60 in the zona de 
despeje were liable for military service with the guerrillas.132  According to 
information obtained by the United Nations, fear of forced recruitment by the 
FARC-EP was a common reason for displacements in the southern part of the 
country.133  Therefore, it’s plausible that part of the significant rise in FARC-EP 
membership and strength through 2002 (see Table 4.1) was due to FARC-EP’s 
consolidation of the zone de despeje, which enabled it to implement a policy of 
forced conscription. 
Some academics do contend that popular support for the guerrillas has 
grown by focusing on the increased number of rural inhabitants who have 
migrated to FARC-EP-dominated regions—particularly the zona de despeje.  
Prior to the FARC-EP’s consolidation of the despeje in 1999, the population of 
the region was estimated to be 100,000.  When the Colombian military 
reoccupied the despeje in February 2002, it was reported that the population in 
the region had grown to almost 740,000.134  Although this may be indicative of 
popular support, to say that migration was solely based on support for the 
insurgents is to overlook the fact that individuals may have been merely 
attempting to flee the violence associated with other regions at the time.  
According to the New York Times, there were only four killings in the first six 
months that the FARC-EP controlled the despeje, in contrast to the typical ten 
                                            
132 United States, Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 
(Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2001); Internet; accessed 
from http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/wha/8326.htm on 13 January 2006.   
133 United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Report of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia, 28 February 2002, para. 227; Internet; 
accessed from 
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/34c2bdd5aa7c0d8bc1256b9d005ab9bd/$FILE/G
0211115.pdf on 13 January 2006. 
134 James J. Brittain, “The FARC-EP in Colombia:  A Revolutionary Exception in an Age of 
Imperialist Expansion,” Monthly Review 57, no. 4 (September 2005), p. 24.  
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killings a week in just months before guerrilla consolidation.135  Therefore, it is 
not improbable to assume that migration patterns reflect a desire for security not 
political ideology.  In fact, Steven Dudley, a journalist who lived in Colombia for 
five years, also questions the depth of peasant support for the FARC-EP.  After 
attending the Bolivarian Movement’s (the FARC-EP’s clandestine political party 
launched in the despeje) first political rally, Dudley concluded that most peasants 
are forced into support the FARC-EP.136   
In addition to imposing its own law in the despeje, the FARC-EP also 
began to restrict and regulate the illicit drug industry within its borders.  To 
strengthen peasant support within its controlled zone, the FARC-EP imposed a 
minimum coca price and eliminated a number of intermediaries.  The granting of 
the despeje enabled the FARC-EP to expand its involvement in the illicit drug 
trade.  It was not long before the FARC-EP took control over the sale of cocaine 
to exporters and controlled refining laboratories.137  The organization even went 
as far as constructing runways in the despeje to facilitate the drug industry as 
well as its weapon imports.138  Considering the significant involvement of the 
FARC-EP in the illicit drug industry within the borders of the despeje, it is no 
wonder that individuals such as retired Colombian colonel Villamarin have 
referred to the FARC-EP as a “drug cartel” even though there is no evidence that 
the FARC-EP has been involved in the international distribution of cocaine to its 
final markets in the United States and Europe.139     
                                            
135 Larry Rother, “Colombia Rebels Reign in Ceded Area,” New York Times, 16 May 1999, 
sec. 1, p. 18.  
136 Although a FARC leader had told Dudley the previous day that the rally would be 
“transcendental,” he had his doubts and began asking the movement’s “supporters” how they felt.  
Not surprisingly, no one spoke until one elderly peasant said looking around, “It’s dangerous to 
talk because they forced us to come here.” Later, a local teacher informed Dudley that “the FARC 
levied fines on those who did not attend the event and ‘in this difficult economic crisis it’s easier to 
get involved than pay.’”  See Dudley, Walking Ghosts, pp. 176-179.   
137 Thoumi, Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes, p. 228. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Villamarin Pulido, The FARC Cartel. 
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3.  Impact on Drugs as a Source of Revenue 
An objective of Plan Colombia—secondary to the destruction of the illicit 
drug industry—was to degrade the FARC-EP’s ability to carry on the war.  In 
targeting the drug trade, the Government of Colombia hoped to strike what was 
believed to be the FARC-EP’s economic center of gravity.  While the 
underground nature of the illicit drug trade makes it extremely difficult to obtain 
relatively accurate estimates of the FARC-EP’s income received through its 
involvement in the drug industry, this section will prove that Plan Colombia’s 
“Push into Southern Colombia” did not impact the FARC-EP’s revenue base.  As 
Chapter III pointed out, Plan Colombia reduced cultivation primarily in Colombia’s 
southern department of Putumayo; however, this initial phase of the plan had 
little impact on estimated FARC-EP revenues.   
Due to the variety of methods and data used to generate such estimates, 
it is relatively ineffective to conduct a year-by-year comparison with multiple 
different estimates.  According to a report issued by the International Crisis 
Group (ICG), it argues that estimates (to include Rensselaer (1998) and UNDP 
(2004)) of FARC-EP drug-related income are highly overstated and offers a more 
accurate estimate of $100 million per year based on interviews it conducted.140  
This estimate is still a significant number considering that in the past decade the 
FARC may have earned upwards of $1 billion with a mere $16.425 million spent 
per year on maintaining an army of 15,000 combatants.141  From this 
perspective, even if all drug-related revenues were eliminated (as the 
Government of Colombia set out to do in Plan Colombia by targeting the FARC-
controlled drug producing areas in southern Colombia) it may not be considered 
a fatal blow to the insurgency as such losses would likely be offset in the near 
term by the organizations accumulation of money from the drug trade or by an 
increase in other activity (i.e., extortion, kidnapping, cattle rustling).   
                                            
140 International Crisis Group, “War and Drugs in Colombia,” p. 19. 
141 Expenses based on the International Crisis Group’s estimation that it would cost 
approximately $3 day to maintain an armed insurgent.  See, International Crisis Group, “War and 
Drugs in Colombia,” p. 19. 
  71
One of the most detailed and an in-depth investigation into the FARC-EP’s 
economic situation was a study released by the Colombian Finance Ministry in 
early 2005.  With unlimited access to all information held by the all branches of 
the Colombia government regarding the FARC-EP, the Finance Ministry’s elite 
Financial Information and Analysis Unit (UIAF) was tasked to provide a detail 
economic analysis of the FARC-EP.  According to the published report, income 
generated from the FARC-EP’s participation in the illicit drug industry (to include 
charging for the protection of illegal crops, collecting coca leaf harvest, producing 
coca base, taxing production laboratories, charging a “per gram tax,” cocaine 
sales and charging traffickers for use of runways) amounted to approximately 
37.000 billion pesos in 2003.142   The investigation revealed, contrary to 
traditional belief, that kidnapping and stolen livestock generated more income for 
the FARC-EP in 2003 (88.560 and 52.668 billion pesos respectively) than their 
involvement in the illicit drug industry.143  While the illicit drug industry does 
provide the FARC-EP with a substantial amount of financing, the UIAF concluded 
that the government must fight kidnapping and cattle rustling in conjunction with 
their fight against drugs in order to impact the economic apparatus of the FARC-
EP.144     
The initial phase of Plan Colombia focused on disrupting elements of the 
drug industry in southern Colombia, leaving the FARC-EP to capitalize not only 
on other income generating activities but also on increasing its involvement in the 
drug trade within the uncontested zona de despeje granted by President 
Pastrana.  While Plan Colombia may have decreased some of the revenues the 
FARC-EP was making off the illicit drug industry in southern Colombia, the zona 
de despeje enabled the FARC-EP to compensate for this loss.  In December 
1998, when the government ordered the withdrawal of the Army and the police to 
facilitate the dialogue with the FARC-EP, there were, officially recorded, 6,300 
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hectares planted with coca throughout the 42,000 sq km demilitarized zone and 
no signs of poppy plantations.  In fact one week after President Pastrana called 
for the retaking of the despeje, counter-narcotics police confirmed the existence 
of vast areas planted with coca and poppy, 16,000 and 420 hectares 
respectively.145  Hence, the establishment of a safe haven (despeje), hampered 
the effectiveness of Plan Colombia to significantly decrease the war-making 
capacity of the FARC-EP.  
C. THE URIBE ADMINISTRATION 
By 2002, it was apparent that a counter-narcotics strategy alone was not 
going to defeat the insurgents.  From 2000-2002, the number of armed attacks 
by the FARC-EP has increased considerably, particularly in 2002 with the 
dissolving of the zona de despeje by President Pastrana in February.  The mid-
year presidential elections in 2002 also served as grounds for increased attacks 
by the FARC-EP, who traditionally challenge the electoral process through 
intimidation and violence.  The landslide victory of Álvaro Uribe Vélez in the 2002 
presidential elections was no exception as the FARC-EP attempted to 
assassinate him three times in the six months leading up to the May elections.  
Uribe’s commitment to end Colombia’s decades-old civil war by taking a hard-line 
stance against armed groups, particularly the FARC-EP, may have won him the 
election but it did not sit well with the guerrillas.  Upon taking office on August 7, 
2002, President Álvaro Uribe Vélez experienced first-hand the FARC-EP’s 
strength and extended reach as his inauguration was overshadowed by an 
unprecedented urban mortar attack by the guerrillas attempting to disrupt the 
ceremony and kill him.        
The Uribe administration’s commitment to end the violence is exhibited in 
its security policy entitled the Democratic Security and Defense Policy (DSP).  
The DSP is a long-term strategy designed to address the security situation in 
Colombia.  The underlying principles behind the strategy are to regain control of 
Colombia’s ungoverned spaces and provide an increased level of security to all 
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sectors of society by establishing or reinstating the rule of law throughout the 
country.146  Along with regaining control of Colombia’s outlying areas, the policy 
is also augmented by a significant expansion in the eradication of illicit crops—
mainly through the extension of the aerial spraying campaign.  With a majority of 
the plans emphasis directed at security programs and counter-narcotics, Uribe’s 
DSP complements a number of objectives originally developed in Plan Colombia.      
This section will review the impact of Uribe’s DSP (a joint counter-
narcotics and counter-insurgency campaign) on the strength of the FARC-EP.  
By observing changes in FARC-EP membership levels, its operational activity 
and intensity, as well as the country’s overall security indicators, this section will 
prove that Uribe’s joint (or unified) strategy has been relatively effective in 
targeting the FARC-EP.  A decline in overall security indicators, membership 
numbers and operational activity, seem to indicate that the efforts to target both 
drugs and the insurgency has substantially weakened but not eliminated the 
FARC-EP.  However, in Uribe’s second term he will be hard-pressed to show 
continuing security successes as the FARC-EP adapt and reductions in security 
indicators begin to plateau.    
1. Impact on Membership  
The Colombian military claims that the decrease in FARC-EP membership 
since 2002 [see Table 4.1] can be attributed the implementation of President 
Uribe’s Democratic Security and Defense Policy, especially its military 
component, Plan Patriota.  Both U.S. and Colombian military statistics agree that 
FARC-EP membership has declined from 18,000 to 12,000 by the end of 
2004.147  However, such claims might be suspect as there is a significant need 
for both countries to demonstrate progress in the Colombian military’s recent 
campaign against the FARC-EP.     
                                            
146 Presidency of the Republic of Colombia, “Democratic Security and Defense Policy” 
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Nevertheless, while the membership estimates in Table 4.1 may be 
optimistic, the general trend regarding a decrease in FARC-EP combatants since 
2002 is consistent with news sources and numerous studies conducted by the 
Conflict Analysis Resource Center (CERAC).148  According to CERAC, the 
number of guerrillas killed per quarter reached an all time peak after President 
Uribe took office in August 2002.  [See Figure 4.2]  Although the number of 
guerrillas killed began to decrease in mid 2003 (possibly as a result of a 
reduction in paramilitary activity due to implementation of the demobilization 
process), there still remains a significant gap between the number of guerrillas 
and government forces killed per quarter.  This information is also concurrent 
with information released by Joint Task Force Omega—the headquarters 
command created to implement Plan Patriota.  [See Table 4.2]  According to the 
statistics from 2004-2005, Joint Task Force Omega has seized a substantial 
number of ammunition and logistic stockpiles, dismantled over 650 FARC-EP 
camps and captured or killed close to 800 FARC-EP combatants.149  Yet, due to 
the unconventional nature of the FARC, it is difficult to evaluate success through 
conventional measures (i.e., number of guerrillas killed, etc.).  Therefore, in order 
to determine the impact of President Uribe’s Democratic Security and Defense 
Policy on the strength of the FARC-EP, analysis must go beyond mere 
membership figures. 
The increased military pressure from President Uribe’s DSP has taken a 
toll not only on FARC membership levels but also on its political structures.  At 
the cost of maintaining territorial control, the DSP has forced guerrilla fronts to 
reduce into smaller, more mobile units.  The DSP has closed off many major 
cities and urban center to the FARC; however, the FARC still maintains a 
significant presence in smaller regional towns.  The inability of the FARC to reach 
major population areas has damaged their indoctrination and political campaign, 
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with the most substantial impact being on their ability to recruit volunteers.150  
The Government of Colombia reported 1,110 desertions for FARC fighters from 
January – September 2006, bringing the estimated total FARC desertions to 
5,100 since the demobilization program was implemented for individuals in 
January 2003.151  While desertions from the FARC are on the rise, one must 
remember that most desertions are by low level members and many of them 
children.152 
Figure 4.2: Number of Government Forces and Guerrillas Killed by 
Quarter, 1988 – June 30, 2005 
 
Source: Michael Spagat and Joe Restrepo, “The Colombian Conflict: Where is it Heading?” 
CERAC, Conflict Analysis Resource Center, Colombian Conflict Database, November 2005; 
Internet; accessed from http://www.cerac.org.co/pdf/CSISPresentationwithtext-V10_Low.pdf on 4 
December 2005. 
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Table 4.2: Colombian Military Reports on Results for Joint Task Force 
Omega, 2004-2005 
 
Source: United States, “’Plan Colombia’: Elements for Success,” p. 12. 
2. Impact on Operational Activity 
An initial glance at Figure 4.4 suggests that Plan Patriota has significantly 
weakened the guerrillas as the numbers of guerrilla attacks since its 
implementation has significantly decreased.  Yet, many analysts contend that the 
drastic reduction in guerrilla attacks is a result of a deliberate decision by the 
FARC to go into a “tactical retreat,” and, therefore, are not necessarily a sign that 
the FARC-EP is on the ropes.153  In other words, the FARC-EP’s “tactical retreat” 
is a consequence of Plan Patriota not a knock out blow to the organization.  
Since 1999, increased aid and training from the United States coupled with 
increased resources for defense from both the United States and the Colombian 
government has strengthened the Colombian military’s capacity to counter the 
guerrillas.154  In anticipation of Uribe’s heavy-handed offensive, the guerrillas 
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have decided to retreat into the jungle, halt most attacks, and avoid direct 
engagements, thereby, returning to its traditional guerrilla warfare tactics 
implemented prior to its transition to “mobile warfare” in the late 1990s (i.e., 
landmines, ambushes, and other small-scale indirect attacks).  This withdrawal 
not only conserves FARC-EP strength but also seeks to win back the support it 
may have lost from the local population during the late 1990s and early 2000s 
when it responded to the paramilitary offensive with a heavy hand.  Now the 
government is accused of using excessive force.  Even General James Hill, 
former commander of the U.S. Southern Command, stated that Plan Patriota 
began “with an attack on rural areas where local peasant farmers support the 
FARC.”155  It may be that the military is viewed as the “aggressor” because it 
targets the people who give food and support the rebels.  This may have been 
precisely what the guerrillas needed to improve their standing with the local 
population.  Nevertheless, even a strategic retreat, one endorsed by Maoist 
theory of revolutionary warfare, is a sign of weakness.   Hence, President Uribe’s 
security policy can be credited with “diminishing the FARC’s ability to carry out 
offensive actions in a sustainable, coherent manner.”156   
However, during the last two years there have been periods of a week or 
two in which it has appeared as though the FARC-EP has shown spasms of 
activity.  After a two year lull, the conflict between the Colombian government 
and the FARC-EP attacks intensified in 2005 and 2006.157  The FARC-EP 
announced in February that it was bringing to an end its policy of “tactical 
withdrawal” and moving into an offensive phase called “Plan Resistencia.”158  
This announcement was immediately followed by major attacks and an increase 
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in the frequency of armed clashes.  Examples include: the February 2005 attack 
on the Iscuandé marine base in southwestern Colombia; the April 2005 attack on 
Toribio in the province of Cauca; the June 2005 attack against military position in 
the location of Puerto Asís in the province of Putumayo; and recent attacks in 
December 2005, February 2006, and August 2006 against Colombian soldiers 
protecting manual eradication workers in a rural area near the Macarena National 
Park.159  Although Uribe’s security policy has placed a significant amount of 
pressure on the FARC-EP, it continues to demonstrate remarkable resilience.  
The aforementioned sporadic and devastating attacks prove that the FARC-EP is 
far from defeated.  The military’s offensive under Uribe has brought the number 
of clashes with the guerrillas to near all-time highs which, in turn, has decreased 
the number of FARC-EP forces and placed the FARC-EP back on the defensive.  
Nevertheless, while attacks by the FARC-EP have subsided under President 
Uribe, it is important to note that they are now consistent with the historical 
average.  [See Figure 4.3]   
Prospects for the FARC in 2006 are different then when President Uribe 
took office in 2002.  When Uribe was inaugurated four and a half years ago, the 
FARC launched mortar attacks against the Presidential Palace in an attempt to 
take Uribe’s life. While the FARC took a more offensive posture as the 
presidential elections drew near, the organization attempt to launch countrywide 
attacks did not have nearly as grand an impact as those during the presidential 
inauguration in 2002.160  This comparison shows that the challenges and threat 
                                            
159 For additional information regarding these attacks see “The Americas: A New 
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posed by the FARC-EP have diminished.  It also exemplifies that Uribe’s DSP 
has weakened the guerrillas’ ability to act. 
Figure 4.3: Number of Guerrilla Attacks by Quarter1988 – June 30, 2005 
 
 
Sources:  Michael Spagat and Joe Restrepo, “The Colombian Conflict: Where is it Heading?” 
CERAC, Conflict Analysis Resource Center, Colombian Conflict Database, November 2005; 
available from http://www.cerac.org.co/pdf/CSISPresentationwithtext-V10_Low.pdf; Internet; 
accessed on 4 December 2005. 
3. Impact on Overall Security 
Uribe's Democratic Security and Defense Policy registered a significant 
degree of progress, as reflected in the overall decrease in kidnappings, 
homicides, and acts of terrorism throughout Colombia.161  [See Table 4.3]  These 
measures can be directly tied to two measures implemented through President 
Uribe’s DSP: the redeployment of troops to main roads and population center as 
well as obtaining a ceasefire by the paramilitary forces prior to negotiations for 
demobilization.162  While the security indicators listed in Table 4.4 continue on a 
downward trend, very few government reports address the fact that the number                                             
161 Government of Colombia, “The Uribe Administration: 3 Years of Progress in Colombia” 
(Washington D.C.: Embassy of Colombia, September 2005), p. 1; available from 
http://www.coltrade.org/Progress.pdf; Internet; accessed on 20 January 2006. 
162 Adam Isacson, “Failing Grades: Evaluating the Results of Plan Colombia,” in Yale 
Journal of International Affairs (Summer/Fall 2005), p. 147. 
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of cases of torture, extrajudicial executions, forced disappearances, and internal 
displacement are on the rise in Colombia.163  According to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported that forced disappearances 
increased in 2005.164  And close to one million people have been displaced since 
President Uribe took office in 2002.  CODHES cites more than 300,000 new 
internally displaced people were recorded in 2005.165  These figures are 
significant as they represent an escalation of the conflict since 2002 and its 
devastating consequence on local communities and an opening of support for the 
guerrillas to capitalize on.     
According to a recent report by the International Crisis Group, “the police 
and army are now in all 1,098 municipalities.166  Their presence is restricted to 
urban areas and the FARC-EP continues to move more or less freely in large 
swaths of the countryside.”167  The main problem with the increased government 
presence in a number of long-neglected zones is that it is predominantly 
comprised of military or police forces and little, if any, non-military investment has 
been done.  As Adam Isacson points out, 
The result has been a frustrating pattern in which a military 
offensive clears out armed groups but the civilian government fails 
to establish itself.  When the military withdraws—which is 
inevitable, since 360,000 troops and police cannot administer all of  
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a territory more than twice the size of California—the illegal armed 
groups simply reenter the zone, filling the security vacuum and 
restoring the status quo.168 
So while the Colombian armed forces have increased operations against illegally 
armed groups, the lack of government presence means that the victory is 
incomplete and the FARC-EP still pose a formidable threat.   
Table 4.3: Security Indicator in Colombia 2002-2006 
INDICATORS 2002-2005 2006 
Homicides - 37 % - 10 % 
Kidnappings (total) - 72 % - 19 % 
Kidnappings w/ Extortion - 76 % - 34 % 
Victims of Massacres - 63 % N/A 
Mobility on Highways + 45 % + 5 % 
Terrorist Acts 1645 (2002) 611 (2005) 
Fuel Theft - 87 % 
Sources: Veillette, “Plan Colombia: A Progress Report,” p. 8; “Colombia: Defense Minister 
Reports on Results of Public Force Activity in 2006,” National Defense Information System, 21 
December 2006, Open Source Center (LAP20061228062002); “Colombia: Kidnapping Rates 
Continue to Decline,” El Pais, 24 January 2007, Open Source Center (LAP20070124347001); 
“Fuel Theft Declines for Sixth Year” El Pais 12 February 2007, Open Source Center 
(LAP20070212335001); U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, 
“Colombia: Background Notes” October 2006; available from 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35754.htm; Internet; accessed on 20 January 2007. 
The FARC-EP’s recent actions indicate that they are attempting to wait out 
the storm (the military’s offensive campaign) and conserve its strength and 
firepower by engaging in indirect attacks against the military.  While the 
Colombian armed forces may now be a stronger and more formidable force than 
a decade ago, the FARC-EP’s “retreat” in 2004 was merely a tactical adjustment.  
It remains a significant threat to the Colombian government.  The FARC-EP 
remain strong enough to dominate up to one third of the country, mostly the deep 
jungles of the south and east, where the army lacks the manpower and other 
resources necessary to challenge them.  Furthermore, recent attacks by the 
FARC-EP demonstrate that the Colombian military is still far from acquiring the 
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superiority necessary to overwhelm and extinguish the insurgency.  The result is 
the continuation of the stalemate.  
D.  CONCLUSION 
Colombian efforts to target the FARC-EP—either indirectly through Plan 
Colombia or directly through Plan Patriota—have made significant progress. Yet, 
the FARC-EP is far from defeated.169  The Colombian government, and its ally 
the United States, developed two distinct yet complementary strategies to deal 
with the dual threat of drugs and terrorism.  The first strategy embodied in 
President Pastrana’s Plan Colombia was fundamentally a counter-narcotics 
strategy until mid-2002.  The second strategy was President Uribe’s Democratic 
Security and Defense Policy, which emphasized the need for a unified strategy to 
target drugs and terrorism simultaneously.  Each strategy has been analyzed 
with the objective of determining what impact, if any, they had on the strength of 
the FARC-EP.  The findings suggest a number of conclusions about the 
changing dynamics of the Colombian conflict.  By understanding these dynamics, 
the Government of Colombia, as well as the United States (a major source of 
financial, technical, and operational support for Colombia), will better be able to 
target resources and adjust strategies.  
As a secondary objective, Plan Colombia sought to decrease the strength 
of Colombia’s armed non-state actors whose resources, it was calculated, came 
largely from the drug trade.  Unfortunately, this has not proven to be the case.  
As coca cultivation figures in Colombia have allegedly decreased since 2000, 
FARC-EP membership, presence, and attacks continued to rise through 2002.   
There are a number of reasons why Plan Colombia “Push into Southern 
Colombia” was ineffective against the FARC-EP.  First, the underlying logic that 
targeting the drug trade would reduce the financial capacity of the FARC-EP was 
flawed.  There is no question that the intensification of the Colombian conflict in 
the mid-to-late 1990s was tied almost directly to the increased involvement of 
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armed non-state actors (particularly the FARC-EP) in the illicit drug industry.  
Narcotics thus provided a resource windfall which enabled the FARC-EP to 
transition to the offensive as illustrated in the series of humiliating defeats it 
inflicted on the Colombian military from 1996-1998.  Logically, one might 
conclude that if the FARC-EP’s participation in the illicit drug trade intensified the 
conflict by providing the guerrillas with vast amounts of money, denying them 
access to such funds would contribute to a de-escalation of the conflict.  This 
was in fact the logic underlying Plan Colombia’s secondary objective to decrease 
the strength of the FARC-EP.  Yet, the basic principle of economics—the law of 
supply and demand—suggests a different conclusion.  Figure 4.4 demonstrates 
that given the inelasticity of demand for drugs, a reduction in supply (shift in the 
supply curve from S to S1) will in fact increase the price (from P to P1).  
Therefore, supply-reduction strategies (such as eradication) have the tendency to 
increase rather than decrease, the revenues of guerrillas involved in the drug 
trade.   
Due to the underground nature of the illicit drug industry, the impact of a 
reduction in coca cultivation in Colombia since 2001 on FARC-EP revenues 
remains in question.  However, we do know that although the drug industry 
represents a significant portion of FARC-EP’s income, it may not be their center 
of gravity—“the hub of all movement upon which everything depends”—which if 
taken out would lead to the breakdown of the organization.  Even if all drug-
related income were eliminated, it would not deliver the fatal blow calculated by 
Plan Colombia.   The guerrilla’s loss of drug-related funds would most likely be 
offset by either money accumulated from the drug trade in previous years or an 
increase in other activity (i.e. kidnapping or extortion).  If the report disclosed by 
the Colombian Finance Ministry in January 2005 is relatively accurate, then 
President Uribe’s DSP through the observed reductions in kidnappings and 
extortion may be hurting the FARC-EP financially.       
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Figure 4.4: Supply and Demand for Drugs 
 
The second reason why efforts to decrease the strength of the FARC-EP 
through counter-narcotics efforts were ineffective has to do with President 
Pastrana’s mismanagement of the peace negotiations with the FARC-EP from 
1998-2002.  The granting in 1998 of a demilitarized zone without any conditions 
or stipulations to the FARC-EP would prove to be a critical error.  The 
demilitarized zone was both viewed as a political and military success for the 
rebels.  As the only recognized power within the zone, the FARC-EP used it as a 
“safe haven” from which to launch attacks, to further expand its role in the illicit 
drug trade, as well as a place to harbor kidnapped victims and train and develop 
its own forces.  The peace process offered the FARC-EP both the time and 
space to further develop and strengthen its force.  While President Pastrana 
justified his actions as a necessary first step in building trust and mutual 
confidence, this trust significantly deteriorated in 2000 as Congress approved 
Washington’s $1.3 billion contribution to Plan Colombia—severely hampering the 
negotiation process until its demise in February 2002.  While Plan Colombia 
attempted to decrease the strength of the FARC-EP indirectly, it negatively 
impacted President Pastrana’s peace negotiations as the FARC-EP consolidated 
its power and expanded in the despeje.  While negotiations were a critical first 
step in determining it a peaceful solution could be attained, its failure proved the  
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FARC-EP was not serious about ending the conflict.  Hence, the Colombia 
population was more apt to support a more confrontational route as proposed by 
President Uribe in 2002.  
According to Vanda Felbab-Brown, when guerrilla movements have 
connections with the narcotics trade (e.g., the Shining Path in Peru), government 
“efforts to eradicate crops and combat drug traffickers will strengthen the alliance 
between the guerrillas and the peasants and the guerrillas and the drug 
traffickers and hamper the government’s overall strategy for ending the 
militarized conflict.”170  In applying this finding to Colombia, one would expect 
that the counter-narcotic operations (e.g., the extensive aerial eradication 
campaign) implemented under Plan Colombia would have pushed a notable 
number of peasants into the hands of the guerrillas.  Yet, this has not been the 
case.  Unlike with the Shining Path in Peru, eradication did not seem to 
contribute significantly to the strengthening of the FARC-EP.  Besides the fact 
that Peru has a significant indigenous population that views growing coca as part 
of its cultural heritage, the primary reason for the difference is that the nature of 
the Colombian threat is inherently different than the threat posed by the Shining 
Path.  In Colombia, there are multiple non-state actors vying for power, from the 
left-wing guerrillas (e.g., ELN and the FARC-EP) to right-wing paramilitary groups 
(e.g., AUC).  The arrival and increased presence of the paramilitaries into 
southern Colombia, especially the department of Putumayo, in 1997 just prior to 
the implementation of aerial fumigation campaign was a contributing factor in the 
weakening of the peasant-guerrilla alliance.  A significant increase in violence 
soon ensued as the paramilitaries and the FARC-EP contested for control in 
Putumayo.  The civilian population in Putumayo was regularly targeted and killed 
by both the FARC-EP and the AUC for “collaborating” with the other side.  The 
paramilitary presence also contributed significantly to the increased tendency for 
the FARC-EP to resort to brutality—to the point where the FARC-EP in 2001 
surpassed the paramilitaries with respect to total number of civilian casualties 
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inflicted.  Therefore, the inability of the FARC-EP to protect the local population 
from the wrath of the paramilitaries and the FARC-EP’s continued heavy-handed 
response to the paramilitary offensive lost the FARC-EP substantial local support 
in the process.  By the time Plan Colombia’s aerial eradication campaign began, 
the FARC-EP’s relationship with local population had been fundamentally altered 
to the point where no policy would have substantially pushed the peasants into 
the arms of the guerrillas. 
As far as President Uribe’s “unified” strategy is concerned, it would seem 
just by looking at the statistics—reductions in the measures of violence, 
reductions in crop cultivation, and the reductions in guerrilla attacks—that it is a 
resounding success.  Yet, Uribe’s strategy is not a resounding success as the 
FARC-EP still poses a formidable threat.  The reduction in violence can be 
primarily attributed to the ongoing demobilization process with the paramilitaries 
(AUC) and not necessarily due to a reduction of guerrilla forces.  As the 
paramilitaries are removed from the conflict, the FARC-EP may be less inclined 
to use brutality against the civilian population.  Furthermore, counter-narcotics 
efforts may undermine the military’s counter-insurgency by pushing coca-growing 
peasants into solidarity with the FARC-EP.171  Despite government efforts to take 
control of FARC-EP-dominated territory, their presence has only been felt in 
population centers, thereby, leaving the FARC-EP to move relatively free in the 
countryside.  Although the military was hailing the FARC-EP’s retreat in 2004 as 
a victory, the counteroffensive launched in late 2005 (although relatively small in 
nature) proves that this retreat was merely tactical in nature.  Military clashes 
with the FARC-EP have hovered at all-time highs under President Uribe, but the 
FARC remain an extremely formidable force at approximately 12,000 strong 
according to Government of Colombia estimates.  As military forces continue to 
progress into FARC-EP-dominated territory, the FARC-EP will maintain the 
tactical advantage of information superiority (i.e., intelligence) and knowledge of 
                                            
171 The Peruvian experience accentuates this finding.  See Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The Coca 
Connection,” pp. 36-37. 
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the terrain.  Until the government can maintain a formidable presence and control 
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V. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Upon separate discussion regarding the overall impact of Colombian 
counter-narcotics efforts implemented within the framework of Plan Colombia as 
well as the impact of both Plan Colombia’s “Push into Southern Colombia” (2000-
2002) and President Uribe’s Democratic Security and Defense Policy (2003-
2005) on the strength of the FARC-EP, it is now possible to separately analyze 
President Pastrana’s sequential strategy and President Uribe’s unified strategy 
against the dual threat of drugs and terrorism.  This chapter will argue that while 
each strategy made substantial strides against one of the two threats, they both 
failed to eliminate either threat; however, President Uribe’s unified campaign was 
more effective than President Pastrana’s drugs first strategy.  While President 
Pastrana’s drugs first strategy was relatively effective in targeting the illicit drug 
trade in Colombia (represented by the substantial decrease in the number of 
hectares cultivated from 1999 to 2003), it did not eliminate the illicit drug industry 
nor did it achieve its secondary objective of weakening the war-making capacity 
of the FARC-EP.  On the other hand, President Urib’es unified attack met 
substantial success with respect to security (as signified by the improved security 
indicators listed in Table 4.3) lead to an observed weakening of the FARC-EP; 
however, a total elimination of the FARC-EP remains out of sight and the 
continuation of counter-narcotic policies seem to be reaping diminishing returns 
as cultivation figures change only marginally.  Despite these results, this chapter 
will also argue that if resources will allow, a unified campaign is the best strategy 
for dealing with the dual threat of drugs and terrorism in Colombia.  The chapter 
will conclude by proposing policy recommendations for the Colombian 
government to improve the effectiveness of its current unified campaign. 
B.   PRESIDENT PATRANA’S SEQUENTIAL STRATEGY 
In the two years leading up to President Pastrana’s inauguration, the 
Colombian country experienced a remarkable increase in violence and insecurity 
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as guerrilla forces launched a nation-wide offensive against government 
installations and its armed forces.  Yet, escalating insecurity and violence were 
not the only challenges facing the Pastrana administration.  The country’s 
economy exacerbated experiencing unprecedented levels of unemployment 
(close to 20 percent in major metropolitan areas) and facing negative growth for 
the first time in over 50 years.172  On top of that, Colombia’s debt more than 
doubled during the Samper administration alone and the repayment burden 
associated with it, forced the Colombian government to cutback significantly its 
budget, particularly in the critical areas of security and social spending which 
hindered the capacity of the Colombian government to solve its problems.173  
The devastating attacks by FARC-EP forces from 1996 to 1998, clearly 
demonstrated the incapacity of the Colombian government and military forces to 
counter the guerrilla threat at the time—one of the major reasons why President 
Pastrana was elected on a platform for peace. 
Without the resources necessary to launch an effective counterinsurgency 
campaign against the guerrillas, President Pastrana was more or less obligated 
to implement a sequential strategy to handle the increased threat posed by drugs 
and armed non-state actors in Colombia.  Although it was recognized that drugs 
were not the root cause of Colombia’s armed conflict, the substantial amount of 
funding allocated for Plan Colombia by the United States, which was dedicated to 
counter-narcotics initiatives, induced President Pastrana to implement a drugs 
first strategy.  By the end of 2002, Pastrana’s drugs first strategy—which a 
majority of the funding was dedicated to the aerial eradication campaign—had 
decreased the amount of coca under cultivation, thereby, returning it to 1998 
levels.  Yet, this decrease in cultivation did not translate into a weakening of the 
FARC-EP as many analysts and policymakers had presumed.  In fact, during 
President Pastrana’s time in office, the FARC-EP actually increased in strength 
as the size of its force and the organization’s number of attacks increased.   
                                            
172 Serafino, Colombia: Current Issues and Historical Background, p. 5 and Government of 
Colombia, Plan Colombia. 
173 Ibid. 
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While an underlying assumption of Plan Colombia was that a reduction in 
the drug trade would deprive the guerrillas of a valuable source of funding, critics 
argued that drugs were not the only source of income for the insurgents.  
Therefore, critics of the Plan believed that targeting the drug trade would merely 
increase the guerrillas’ involvement in other income generating activities such as 
kidnapping and extortion.  But, kidnapping and extortion rates witnessed a 
downward trend beginning in 1999 just prior to the implementation of Plan 
Colombia.174  Other critics of Pastrana’s drugs first strategy, to include Falbab-
Brown, claim that while the impact of efforts to target the drug trade on guerrilla 
financial resources remain questionable, counter-narcotics initiatives in Peru 
demonstrate that such efforts strengthen the alliance between the guerrillas and 
the peasants.  Due to the peasants’ mistrust and disenchantment with the FARC-
EP following the 1996 peasant marches and the FARC-EP’s increased brutality 
against civilians in response to the amplified paramilitary presence in southern 
Colombia at the onset of Plan Colombia, the counter-narcotics efforts associated 
with its “Push into Southern Colombia” did not coincide with a notable influx of 
peasants flocking into the arms of the insurgents.  During President Pastrana’s 
term in office, the FARC-EP had continued to increase in strength despite 
decreases in cultivation, a downward trend in kidnappings, and the inability of the 
FARC-EP to capitalize on the population’s anger against the aerial eradication 
campaign.  
What factor did cause the substantial increase in FARC-EP strength 
during President Pastrana’s term in office?  FARC-EP strength increased from 
2000 to 2002, not as a result of Plan Colombia’s “Push into Southern Colombia” 
but as a result of President Pastrana’s handling of the insurgent threat.  It could 
be argued that President Pastrana’s approach to handling the dual threat of 
drugs and terrorism was in fact not sequential but simultaneous.  While President 
Pastrana did not directly confront the guerrillas militarily, he did enter into peace                                             
174 Mauricio Rubio, “Kidnapping and Armed Conflict in Colombia,” Paper presented at the 
PRIO Workshop on “Techniques of Violence in Civil War,” August 2004; Internet; accessed from 
http://www.prio.no/cscw/pdf/micro/techniqes/Kidnapping%20and%20armed%20conflict%20in%20
Columbia.pdf on 28 February 2006. 
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negotiations with the FARC-EP from 1998 to 2002.  The decision by the 
Government of Colombia in 1998 to grant the FARC-EP a demilitarized zone 
(zona de despeje) the size of Switzerland without conditions or stipulations would 
prove to be a critical error as the despeje was viewed as a political and military 
success for the guerrillas.  As the only recognized power within the zone, the 
FARC-EP used it as a “safe haven” from which to launch attacks, to further 
expand it role in the illicit drug trade, as well as a place to harbor kidnapped 
victims and train and develop its own forces.  Therefore, the peace process 
offered the FARC-EP both the time and space necessary to further develop and 
strengthen its force.  While Plan Colombia attempted to decrease the strength of 
the FARC-EP indirectly, President Pastrana’s peace negotiations were having 
the direct opposite effect as the FARC-EP capitalized on the illicit drug industry, 
consolidated its power, and expanded in the despeje.  President Pastrana’s 
peace overtures both negated and impeded the ability of Plan Colombia initially 
to target effectively the FARC-EP’s involvement in the illicit drug industry. 
C.  PRESIDENT URIBE’S UNIFIED STRATEGY 
The tragic events of September 11, 2001 highlighted to U.S. policymakers 
the role illicit drug economies play in undermining government stability through 
the funding of armed non-state actors, to include terrorists.  Following 9/11 the 
fight against terrorism was placed at the forefront of U.S. policy around the world.  
When Colombia was included in the Global War on Terrorism, it brought a major 
policy shift with regards to the allocation of U.S. assistance in Colombia.  By mid-
2002, the U.S. Congress agreed that a war on drugs is central to any effort to 
undermine armed non-state actors who benefit from involvement in the drug 
trade.  And the laws governing aid destined for Colombia were changed, now 
allowing all previous aid given solely for counter-narcotics efforts to be used in a 
“unified” campaign against Colombian guerrillas and paramilitaries—
organizations who were already on the State Department’s list of Foreign  
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Terrorist Organizations.  Upon his election into office in 2002, President Uribe 
embodied this unified strategy in his Democratic Security and Defense Policy 
(DSP). 
Rather than being on the defensive, President Uribe’s DSP increased the 
size and capabilities of the Colombian military enabling them to take an offensive 
against the both the FARC-EP and the illicit drug industry.  Plan Patriota, the war 
strategy of the DSP, sought to halt the FARC-EP’s reach, logistics, and their 
organization.  The Colombian government would stop the guerrillas from 
achieving their strategic plan of assuming power through its control of entire 
regions in the south and east.  By re-controlling cities and key economic areas 
from FARC-EP control, the Colombian government has left the guerrilla 
organization with the smallest percentage of territory under its control in its entire 
history.175  Overall, the insurgents have lost territory as observed in their 
expansion and growth along Colombia’s border regions.  Increasing the number 
of confrontations with the guerrillas since he took office in 2002, President 
Uribe’s policy decreased FARC-EP membership numbers and forced the FARC-
EP into a “tactical withdrawal,” thereby, decreasing the organization’s operational 
activity.  However, the FARC-EP remained a formidable force of approximately 
9,000-12,000 strong.  The organization has learned to adapt to and continues to 
maintain the will and capability to fight—as exemplified in their use of landmines 
to halt manual eradication efforts in La Macarena National Park.   
Despite a sixth consecutive record year for illicit crop eradication and 
continued aggressive interdiction programs, President Uribe’s extension of Plan 
Colombia’s counter-narcotics efforts only showed marginal changes by 2005.  In 
fact, White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) reported that 
an additional 39,000 hectares of coca in Colombia was observed in newly  
                                            
175 Unattributed, “Colombian Government Readying Peace Proposal for FARC,” Semana, 
14-20 September 2006; Open Source Center (FEA20060815026374). 
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imaged areas in 2005 (outside the 2004 survey area).176  The ratio of hectares 
sprayed to hectares reduced has increased since 2002, an indication that the 
aerial eradication campaign is on a path of diminishing returns.  Rather than 
deterring farmers to plant coca, eradication efforts seem to be encouraging 
farmers to plant more coca in anticipation of potential loss due to eradication.  
Farmers continue to adapt to the situation (i.e., decreases in the size of areas 
under cultivation, covering coca leaves or pruning them after fumigation, etc.) as 
well as seeking other areas in which to continue growing coca.  All in all the 
aerial fumigation campaign has inconvenienced coca farmers, but does not seem 
to have affected the guerrilla economy or decreased their involvement in the illicit 
drug trade.   
D. SEQUENTIAL OR UNIFIED: WHICH IS BEST FOR COLOMBIA? 
The Peruvian case clearly demonstrates the effectiveness of a sequential 
approach in managing a dual threat; however, it is not clear that the Peruvian 
case is either comparable or applicable to Colombia.  In Colombia, there are 
multiple armed non-state actors vying for power, from left-wing insurgent groups 
such as the FARC-EP and the National Liberation Army (ELN) to right-wing 
paramilitary organization such as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia 
(AUC), all of which either incorporated or have links to criminal organizations.   
President Pastrana applied a drugs first sequential approach to tackling the multi-
dimensional threat in Colombia under the assumption that elimination of the drug 
industry would deprive the guerrillas of a valuable source of funding, limiting their 
capability and reducing troop levels.  However, despite decreases in the area 
under cultivation, President Pastrana failed to eliminate the drug trade and 
                                            
176 In an effort to improve the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the estimate, the 2005 
survey expanded by 81 percent the size of the landmass that was imaged and sampled for coca 
cultivation.  The newly imaged areas showed about 39,000 additional hectares of coca.  Because 
these areas were not previously surveyed, ONDCP believes it is impossible to determine for how 
long they have been under coca cultivation.  Due to the uncertainty and the significantly 
expanded survey area, a direct year-to-year comparison is not possible.  According to an ONDCP 
press release, they believe that the higher cultivation figure in the 2005 estimate does not 
necessarily mean that coca cultivation increased in 2005; but rather reflects an improved 
understanding of where coca is now growing in Colombia.  Office of National Drug Control Policy, 
“2005 Coca Estimates for Colombia,” Press Release: 14 April 2006.    
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actually increased the strength of the FARC-EP.  As President Pastrana’s policy 
proved eliminating the FARC-EP by targeting drugs was difficult for a number of 
reasons.   
For one thing, the underlying logic that targeting the drug trade would 
reduce the financial capacity of the FARC-EP was flawed.  Given the inelasticity 
of demand for drugs, a reduction in supply will in fact increase the price.  
Therefore, supply-reduction strategies (such as eradication) have the tendency to 
increase rather than decrease, the revenues of guerrillas involved in the drug 
trade.  Secondly, the government failed to consider the extreme mobility of coca 
within Colombia.  While some initial decreases in cultivation were made, 
eradication has merely created geographic shifts in cultivation both within 
Colombia and the entire Andean region in general.  Without close to 100% 
territorial control, the Colombian government will be ineffective in reducing such 
shifts.   
Lastly, it’s important to remember that, the sheer scale of the illicit drug 
industry (typically measured in dollars) is an important determinant of the 
potential contribution it potentially makes to terrorism.  According to Mark 
Kleiman, to make “drug policy serve the anti-terror effort, shrinking dollar 
volumes (and secondarily, the volume of the physical flows of drugs and 
personnel) is a central task.”177  The correct weighing of drug control objectives 
against anti-terrorist objectives depends in part on how much drug industry 
actually contributes to the threat of terrorist action, and how much anti-drug 
efforts could do to reduce that contribution.  Not only did the record high seizures 
and hectares eradicated during President Pastrana’s time in office not decreased 
the flow of illicit drugs to the United States, but it was later assessed that the 
FARC-EP’s drug related income may not be their center of gravity.  If all drug-
related income were eliminated, it would not deliver the fatal blow initially 
calculated by Plan Colombia. 
                                            
177 Mark A. R. Kleiman, “Illicit Drugs and the Terrorist Threat: Causal Links and Policy 
Implications,” Report prepared for the Congressional Research Service, 18 October 2002.   
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An argument for simultaneously attacking a dual threat can be made when 
the threats are so interlinked that they require simultaneous attention.  The rise of 
the FARC-EP as the de facto government in many rural areas of Colombia 
coupled with their increased involvement in the illicit drug industry called for the 
need to simultaneously attack the dual threat of drugs and the insurgency.  There 
are number of reasons why a simultaneous campaign is the best option for 
Colombia.  First of all, President Pastrana’s failure to decrease the strength of 
the FARC-EP through a purely counter-narcotics strategy, increased the 
government and public’s awareness that a military solution might be the only 
effective strategy in eliminating the FARC-EP.  The use of military force could 
possibly provide the pressure required to persuade the guerrillas to eventually 
take peace negotiations seriously.  Secondly, the center of gravity of the FARC-
EP was not its involvement in the drug industry but its territorial control and 
recognition as the de facto government in outlying areas of Colombia.  Bringing 
these areas under the effective control of the Colombian government would be a 
devastating blow to the strength of the FARC-EP as such actions would 
decrease the ability of the insurgency to feed on the local population.  Thirdly, 
battling narco-guerrillas has the advantage of resolving both the guerrilla and 
drug problems in a particular area if operations are coordinated.  Increased aerial 
eradication since 2003 has begun to log diminishing returns, which should argur 
for the importance of manual eradication.  However, counter-narcotics measures 
such as manual eradication (as observed in La Macarena) will not be successful 
without first eliminating the threat guerrillas pose to eradication teams and 
alternative development programs—signifying that counter-insurgency and 
counter-narcotics policies must go hand-in-hand.    
E. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The nature of the multi-dimensional threat confronting the Colombian 
government calls for a continuation of Uribe’s comprehensive unified strategy.  
Close to one year has transpired since President Uribe began his second 
presidential term.  Although weakened, the FARC-EP still dominate up to one 
third of the country, including the deep jungles of the southern and eastern 
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Colombia where the military lacks the manpower and the resources to challenge 
them.  While peace negotiations with the FARC-EP remain a possibility during 
Uribe’s second term, the FARC-EP has yet to show a real willingness to engage 
in peace talks.  Uribe’s military efforts against the FARC-EP are not viewed as a 
failure; however, there is still much progress to be made.  While the Government 
of Colombia acknowledges that it cannot kill every last rebel, it seeks to inflict a 
strategic defeat on the FARC-EP.  Only then will a peace process with FARC-EP 
be successful.    
The following recommendations are offered to the Government of 
Colombia in an effort to assist in furthering its comprehensive unified strategy 
against the dual threat of drugs and terrorism: 
1. Coordinate Military/Police Actions with Developmental 
Projects 
In its unified campaign the Government of Colombian has failed to win the 
hearts and minds of population who live in the territory it is seeking to control.  
While the military and/or police have established a presence in all 1,098 
municipalities in Colombia, alternative development projects, economic 
opportunity, social investment and rule of law often failed to follow suit.  While 
security and order are important foundations, it must be followed and balanced 
with viable economic and social development options.  Not offering viable 
alternatives increases the need and desire for the local population to revert back 
to its dependence on the guerrillas and/or the illicit drug trade.  Hence, military 
operations (whether their counter-insurgency or counter-narcotics driven) need to 
be coordinated with developmental assistance programs or else areas of recent 
acquisition will fall back into the hands of the insurgents over time.  The 
Government of Colombia’s establishment of the Coordination Center for 
Integrated Action (CCAI), an interagency organization to reestablish governance 
in previously ungoverned spaces of Colombia through synchronizing military 
operations with the operations of other ministries, is clearly a step in the right 
direction.  However, substantial effort should be placed on ensuring this strategic 
level coordination center trickles down to the tactical level. 
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2. Define Responsibilities and Enforce Cooperation Among 
Services 
To be effective, a unified campaign needs to be coordinated not just 
among state agencies (as discussed above), but also among security forces.  In 
Colombia, the national police are typically tasked with the counter-narcotics 
campaign while the military primarily handle the threat posed by illegally armed 
non-state actors.  However, as these non-state actors have become closely 
linked with the illicit drug trade, the military and police roles in targeting narco-
guerrillas have overlapped.  As with many Latin American countries, rivalry runs 
deep among the different branches of the military and Colombia is no exception.  
Animosity between the army and the police in Colombia is fierce and has 
fostered an atmosphere of distrust and a lack of cooperation between the two 
organizations.  This is particularly true with respect to intelligence sharing.  All 
military intelligence entities function to provide usable information to their specific 
command so as to carry out the objectives inherent to their mission.  Despite 
increasingly overlapping mission, the national police and military fail to share 
information.  This lack of intelligence sharing has cost money, lives, and 
resources.  The roles of each of the security entities must clearly be defined, 
intelligence sharing agreements among services developed, and increased joint 
cooperation and coordination must be promoted and encouraged to effectively 
fight against Colombia’s dual threat.  
3. Be Alert to Finite Resources 
It is a harsh fact that resources are finite.  With U.S. assistance and 
funding from his “war tax,” President Uribe was able to fund both an intense 
military initiative against the FARC-EP as well as an intense counter-narcotics 
campaign against the illicit drug trade.  As the involvement of the U.S. in Iraq and 
Afghanistan continues to escalate, it is inevitable that U.S. assistance to 
Colombia will decrease.  The potential decrease in external funding and the 
depletion of funds provided by the “war tax” will severely impact the resources 
available to President Uribe to conduct a simultaneous campaign, especially if 
the present scandal over paramilitary influence in the military and government 
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grows.  If Uribe is unable to find additional external funding or does not get the 
population’s approval for an additional “war tax,” his administration must become 
masters at resource allocation as there will be no room for errors or 
miscalculations.  A thorough and accurate understanding of the enemy (FARC-
EP and the drug trade) will be paramount as this will assist the state in 
determining what actions are more likely to break the will of the FARC-EP, 
thereby, bring them to the negotiating table.  
4. Negotiations May Not Be the Answer 
President Uribe was re-elected in August 2006 with 62 percent of the vote.  
He has now been elected twice to win the war and knows that he cannot go 
down in history as the man who failed to achieve peace.  Acknowledging the 
impossibility of eliminated every FARC-EP guerrilla during his last term in office, 
President Uribe understands that he must break the will of the FARC-EP to fight 
and push them to the negotiating table in order for the prospect of peace to 
emerge.  However, President Uribe must progress cautiously and attentive in the 
demobilization of the paramilitaries and the potential cease-fire agreement with 
the ELN, as the agreements developed with these organizations will likely set the 
baseline for an eventual agreement with the FARC-EP.  President Uribe needs to 
take the needs of the Colombia state into consideration when he discusses the 
issue of peace negotiations and not his presidential legacy.  Using the Pastrana 
administration as an example, if the Uribe administration enters into negotiations 
with the FARC-EP too soon, it would negate the success of Uribe’s DSP to date 
by providing the FARC-EP with time (and potentially space if a DMZ is granted) 
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